



Daily Report

East Europe

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NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

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Albania: Prime Minister Submits Program to Parliament

AU2407073096 Tirana ATA in English
1330 GMT 23 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 23 (ATA)—The Democratic government created after the elections of May 26 submitted its program to parliament, which aims at moving swiftly towards full reform of the Albanian economy and a developed market economy keeping the fast rates of the economic growth and welfare of Albanians, the Albanian Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi told parliament on Monday.

The reformation of the economy has been and is a priority of the Democratic government for this legislature which will be carried out through a series of measures aiming at deepening the process of privatisation within the end of the century, guaranteeing the right of ownership to make it sacred; improving legal framework to reflect and precede social economic development, creating conditions for a financial and labour market and improving state governing in all levels by harmonising the central and local governing, Meksi said.

"To achieve these objectives it is important to have a harmonisation of fiscal policies with the monetary ones and a relatively moderated fiscal policy," Meksi said.

He pointed out three priorities of the economic policy: support and improvement of infrastructure, tourism, agriculture and agro industry; stimulation of livestock development and small and medium production by boosting the branches of light and alimentary industry.

"Among the major goals of the government is the stabilisation and reduction of budget deficit which will have a social profile," Meksi said saying that "this will be carried out through an increase of income taxes and reduction of fiscal evasion."

Focusing on the major objectives of the legislative and institutional reform, Meksi said that they will continue work to complete the needed legal framework both for a democratic state and a market economy. Among the major tasks of the future program Meksi cited the drafting of a new draft constitution and the observance of approved laws.

As regards the public order, Meksi said that the main objectives of the government will be to ensure a complete security of life and property, guarantee liberty and maintain public order and law.

Focusing on improvement of local governing, he said that the present legislation will be improved and new laws and bylaws will be drafted to regulate the local government activity.

Meksi spoke about the administrative reform and fight against corruption.

"The government considers corruption as most dangerous for democracy and it is decided to wage an uncompromising fight against it and corrupted elements," Meksi said.

He stressed that the defence of the national interests will be the first duty of the defence policy, public order and security. Main objectives in the field of defence will be the preparation for the integration of the Albanian army into NATO.

Speaking about Albanian foreign policy, he said that its main objective will be increasing efforts for Albania's swift integration into the euro-atlantic organisations, European Union, NATO and Western European Union as well as boosting its diplomatic activity to strengthen the friendly traditional relations between Albania and the U.S., Germany, Italy, France, Austria, Turkey, Greece, England and others.

He also stressed that efforts will continue to defend the national issue of Albanians in Kosova, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and in other Albanian ethnic territories.

Albania: Council of Ministers 22 Jul Decisions Outlined

AU2307064896 Tirana ATA in English
1340 GMT 22 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 22 (ATA)—The Albanian Council of ministers, presided over by Premier Aleksander Meksi, on Monday took several decisions, including the approval in principle of the understanding agreement between the government of the Republic of Albania and AMBO Corporation on the Trans-Balkan Black Sea-Adriatic Sea pipeline.

The Premier's Press Office press release also reports that the Council of Ministers decided to extend for a three month period, until September 30, 1996, the deadline for accepting by the property restitution and compensation commissions of the necessary requests and documents of the former owners or their legal heirs claiming compensation in value of the agricultural land.

Another draft-decree approved in the meeting was that exempting from the law "on bankruptcy procedures" the enterprises, which, until the enforcement of the decree, depend on the Enterprise Restructuring Agency. Their bankruptcy and liquidation will be carried out in administrative ways and according to the criteria and procedures approved by the Council of Ministers.

The ministers decided to transfer the Project Implementation Department to the Ministry of Health and Environment. The financing for payment funds of this department is included in the Albanian Government's contribution for the application of a series of cooperation projects in the field of environment.

The government also decided to finance the international seminar to be held in Tirana "On the Albanian language, literature and culture."

Albania: Berisha Addresses PD on Goals for Local Elections

AU2307184496 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE
in Albanian 23 Jul 96 p 1

[Speech by Albanian President Sali Berisha to the Democratic Party National Council in Tirana on 22 July]

[FBIS Translated Text] The local elections will be the most important political event this year after the elections of 26 May. The Democratic Party [PD] is approaching these elections with determination and is aiming at another strong and deserved victory in the history of democracy. It aims to expand its participation in government and to improve local government, correcting the serious errors and defects in local government over the last four years, and also to make dynamic progress in the electoral process in Albania.

The PD, as the main political force and the one that people trust most, undoubtedly has a great advantage. Just as in the 26 May elections, we are putting the best candidates forward. This will improve our chances and make it possible to present Albanians with candidates who are the most outstanding men, women, boys, and girls of our local communities. In choosing our candidates, we must bear in mind that renewal is our constant motto if we are to remain the party of the future.

By renewal we do not mean that anyone should be punished. By renewal, we hope to remain a party of the future. In fact, a five-year-old party that has renewed 72 percent of its management structures in the last 18 months demonstrates extraordinary vitality. This is one of the basic factors of continued trust in the PD. While not denying anyone's merits or contributions, we must bring these merits and contributions in harmony with the incontestable and continuing demand of the Albanian electorate for renewal. We must correct what is an unacceptable imbalance in local government. If approximately 24 percent or more of the parliament is worthily represented by women and girls, we must extend this balance to local government. There are distinguished and dedicated female intellectuals and capable experts in every commune, locality, municipality, and district.

In the process of renewal, we are obliged to bear in mind this balance, which is of great importance. In this process, I think we must also keep in mind a reduction in the age of our local government representatives. I do not mean we should exclude the older generation, but reducing the age of our representatives would be a great advantage for us and would bring new vigor to these institutions. Let us select honest experts, specialists, and intellectuals in every village and commune, dedicated people who are well known for their virtue and character. That is the sure path to victory.

Second, we set out major national objectives in our political program for the legislative elections, and we will also have major national objectives in these elections, but it is not these objectives that will determine our victory.

It is our local program for every commune and municipality that will determine our victory in these elections. Let us study together what each commune needs and promise what we are able to perform.

We are a powerful political force, and we have proved that we can stand up and win, but we are also open to coalitions. In what sense?

First, in the second round, we will support, regardless of whatever stand we take, those parties whose programs we consider to be closest to our own.

There are several problems that are very important as far as refinement of the electoral process is concerned. We must understand the electoral process as one of the most important processes for the development of democracy. We must put aside all orchestration, because we must deal intensively and seriously with improving the electoral process, which is a dynamic process that is vital for the functioning of democracy in Albania.

On this basis, we must apply those recommendations of the Council of Europe and the OSCE that we judge to be genuinely in the interest of the electoral process.

Take for example the permanent commissions. Countries with developed democracies have permanent commissions. We will immediately create them.

We cannot pretend at the start that we can build a commission with nonparty members, because in fact party passions are at this phase still normal and acceptable in individuals. I suggest that we build a permanent party commission with members proposed by the parties. I consider this very necessary.

This commission should have the official responsibility not only to carry out formalities for a period of 20 days or in the final month, but to continually attend to the

dynamics of the electoral process and electoral culture in all respects.

Boycotts, not political boycotts but boycotts of the vote counting, will be prevented by law. Some experts in the history of civilized elections say this byzantine trap has only been set once before, and others say never.

The law will set forth the responsibilities of the commission members in order to prevent them from withdrawing from the elections without suffering legal sanctions.

Otherwise Stalinist forces could install the theory of permanent revolution by boycotting the counting. This is a new and modern variation of the proletarian revolution, which we will resist.

Let every person either participate in the elections or not as he so chooses. That is a decision for every political force to make. However, a legally appointed commission that is paid for its work cannot withdraw without suffering clear legal sanctions.

Another problem I will raise here is that of the files. As a political force, we have favored the opening of the files only of senior politicians. That is true.

I agree with the law on screening official figures and the antigenocide law. One article in the law on screening official figures, however, conflicts with our principles. If we say that the law on the files is a law to close them, the opening of the files for communal councillors transforms the law into the opposite of what we claim it is. We would be obliged to open 40,000 files. I propose to ask parliament to remove this article. It conflicts with our clear and transparent principle of keeping the files closed.

Our principle has been to open the files of senior politicians.

The problem of decentralization is an important one. We must aim to decentralize the responsibilities of local

authorities. What might be interpreted as centralism is in fact a demand for enforcement of the law, while the decentralization of the authorities of local government and financial decentralization are extremely important for the application of development programs.

The local election campaign will be more difficult than the general election campaign. That is because general messages have a lesser impact than local messages. It is very important for the press to be dynamic, to display as many candidates as possible, and to organize a debate.

There is every chance of a second decisive victory. This victory will be decided by how much we work to achieve it. We are a party of unshaken confidence.

The left is undergoing a process of reform that I would call positive, but the rivers of Albania must flow for a long time to rinse away the left's Enverism and Stalinism.

This, again, is a positive process. We cannot fail to welcome the condemnation of E. Hoxha and of Marx and of state control of the economy. All their other efforts are in an unhesitatingly positive direction.

I want to express my regret that the press is portraying these changes as clan rivalry or attempts to pull the rug out from under each other's feet when I see serious efforts in the Socialist Party, the main opposition party, to make a break with the past. This is no doubt an indisputable advantage for us, but we cannot base our election campaign on the quandaries of our opponent.

Our election campaign will be based above all on our constructive alternative.

Thus, persuaded of a strong and deserved victory, let us not lose a single day between now and the local elections so we may record the victory that the PD deserves at local level, too.

Bulgaria: SDS Statement on Court's Citizenship Ruling

AU2407122196 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
24 Jul 96 p 1

["Statement by the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces" issued in Sofia on 23 July]

[FBIS Translated Text] We are alarmed by the confrontation of the members of the government with the state institutions. In this way, they are striving to deflect attention away from the disastrous situation of the people.

We strongly oppose this attempt by our failed rulers to make the supreme institutions of state targets for attacks.

The BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] is involving the Constitutional Court in its own inner party problems, and by so doing is not behaving as a political force with a sense of national responsibility. The Socialists created political tension by nominating a person as their presidential candidate in whose Bulgarian citizenship both they and the candidate himself had doubts in advance.

If it were concerned for the stability of society, the BSP would not have first nominated a suspect candidate, and then come into confrontation with the Constitutional Court's decision. It should first have inquired whether Pirinski satisfied the requirements of the Bulgarian Constitution before nominating a presidential candidate.

The SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] has asked the Constitutional Court to issue a ruling on how to determine who is a Bulgarian citizen by birth, so as to avoid further exacerbation of the crisis of the institutions. By this act, we want to prevent the BSP from evading real political elections, using a defective candidate to escape responsibility for its own terrible administration, and fleeing from its own administration on the justification of allegedly political decisions by the country's supreme institutions.

By obtaining the Constitutional Court's response, we are not solving our own political problem, because there is no more convenient Socialist candidate for us than Georgi Pirinski.

We want such an opponent—a privileged son of a pro-Macedonian apostate, a man of the old communist oligarchy, a person who evaded military service, a 100 percent Communist from Sequoia Street [headquarters of the Sixth Directorate of the communist Interior Ministry, responsible for surveillance of intellectuals], a man responsible for our country incurring billions of dollars of debts in Todor Zhivkov's time, a close comrade and

deputy of Andrey Lukanov, and a responsible minister in the present BSP government, which within 18 months has completely ruined the country and brought our people into a wretched condition.

We need such an opponent, who symbolizes the BSP.

The SDS does not want the opposition simply to win the presidential elections. We want to rout the BSP in these elections because of its irresponsible attitude to the fate of the people, because of the muddle and penury, because of the violent attacks, robberies, and murders of organized crime, which has merged with the people in power.

We will win these elections to ensure that Bulgaria will continue to exist.

Bulgaria: Democratic Left Meets Following Court Ruling

AU2407090096 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network
in Bulgarian 0400 GMT 24 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Last night the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group held a three-hour meeting, together with the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and the coalition partners, the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian National Agrarian Union and the Ecoglasnost Political Club, but the meeting failed to reach a decision. The discussion was prompted by new situation that had arisen following the Constitutional Court's decision on the issue of Bulgarian citizenship. It was a continuation of yesterday's meeting of the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group in the National Assembly, in which Zhan Videnov and cabinet ministers took part.

The discussion will continue at 1800 this evening at the BSP headquarters in Sofia.

Bulgaria: BSP MP's Divided Over Pirinski's Candidacy

AU2407120096 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian
24 Jul 96 p 3

[Article by Ekaterina Nikolova: "Yanaki Stoilov: Pirinski Has No Chance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—Georgi Pirinski cannot be registered by the Central Electoral Commission as a presidential election candidate after the categorical decision of the Constitutional Court and the majority by which it was adopted. BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Supreme Council Deputy Chairman Yanaki Stoilov reportedly told the BSP deputies yesterday. Yesterday the deputies hastily gathered in parliament to consider whether to announce to the electors that the foreign

minister is the Socialist candidate or not. No decision was reached.

Stefan Gaytandzhiev, deputy leader of the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group and leader of the Ecoglasnost Political Club, reportedly made a direct call for the BSP to select a new candidate. Mariana Khristova and Zlatimir Orsov also came out in favor of replacing Pirinski. Orsov demanded that Yanaki Stoilov be called to account for the fact that the commission he chairs at the BSP Supreme Council misled the rulers with their view that there were no obstacles to Pirinski's candidature. The deputy party chief maintained a guilty silence. Pirinski's running mate Prof. Ivan Marazov did not utter a word, either.

Our candidate is Pirinski, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov declared peremptorily, and he reportedly defended the view that the BSP candidate be presented for registration irrespective of the Constitutional Court's decision. Even before the judges announced their decision, at the insistence of Zhan Videnov, the members of the BSP Executive Bureau rallied around the view that Pirinski would not be replaced. However, the BSP Parliamentary Group split on the issue and disseminated a statement claiming that the Constitutional Court ruling was politically motivated, and for this reason, the BSP should respond to it in a political manner. Late last night, the Socialist group summoned Pirinski to BSP headquarters to hear whether he was resigning from the campaign or not.

Bulgaria: Premyanov Assesses Court Ruling, Coup Ruinor

AU2407123596 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 24 Jul 96
p 9

[Interview with Krasimir Premyanov, chairman of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction, by Valeriya Veleva; place and date not given: "BSP Has No Reason To Withdraw Pirinski's Candidacy"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Veleva] Mr. Premyanov, what will the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] do after the 23 July ruling of the Constitutional Court, which eliminates Pirinski as a candidate for president?

[Premyanov] There is no doubt that the judicial motives on the basis of which we adopted the political decision regarding Pirinski's candidacy were sufficiently strong. If the Constitutional Court were ruling on the basis of an objective assessment of the circumstances and facts, it should have based its ruling on interpreting the Constitution, which is its exclusive task, and not the laws. This cannot be explained by judicial reasons but by other, political considerations. Obviously, carried away by the "Pirinski" case, the Constitutional Court has

violated the rights of tens of thousands of Bulgarian citizens who were born as a result of mixed marriages, or born abroad, by classifying them in different categories. The Constitutional Court could expand the formula in its ruling. However, all this does not mean that our candidate Georgi Pirinski is not suitable to be Bulgaria's president, or that his candidacy contradicts the Constitution. On the contrary, the future developments in his candidacy will significantly clarify the arguments that support his suitability in accordance with the basic law.

[Veleva] Does this mean that the BSP will not withdraw Pirinski's presidential candidacy?

[Premyanov] I see no reasons—neither judicial nor political—for the BSP to relinquish Pirinski's candidacy. The decision of the Constitutional Court does not in itself provide sufficient reasons for such a move. [passage omitted]

[Veleva] In other words, the 23 July decision of the Constitutional Court has no value for the BSP?

[Premyanov] On the contrary. However, the ruling has not been addressed personally to anyone. The narrow formula of the ruling offers the possibility of further developments.

[Veleva] Nevertheless, wouldn't this fact prompt some BSP members to seek other candidacies?

[Premyanov] The BSP is a big party, and the Democratic Left includes two additional parties. Everyone can express his opinion. I think that the political will was expressed at our joint meeting when we nominated our candidate, and there is no reason to change this decision. [passage omitted]

[Veleva] Do you think that certain circles are concocting plans for a coup or for declaring a state of emergency? The people are relating the arrival of the Russian tanks to the interference of a "strong hand" in the state's affairs.

[Premyanov] This is not serious. We are a party whose majority supported this Constitution, in which the principles of our country's democracy are vested. Such intentions, regardless of what circles are they coming from, cannot be implemented under our rule. We are sufficiently strong to defend our country's democracy and constitutional order. I would like to take this opportunity to warn, through your newspaper's pages, such overt or secret adventurers, if they indeed exist in Bulgaria, not to harbor any illusions. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: BSP's Kalinov, Premyanov Discount OSD Demands

AU2407092396 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 24 Jul 96
p 2

[Article by Vesela Doneva]

[FBIS Translated Text] We have not yet officially received the documents prepared by part of the leadership of the Alliance for Social Democracy [OSD], but their idea is neither new nor original. Vasil Kalinov, member of the Executive Bureau of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], made this reply when asked by a journalist to comment on the recent decisions of the OSD Political Council. In Kalinov's opinion, the formula proposed by the OSD is doomed to fail, and does not present the interest that its authors are trying to attribute to it before the public. Kalinov recalled that the OSD plays a part in formulating all the decisions of the BSP organs.

We are a democratic party, and accept a plurality of opinions, especially when it concerns politicians who have been declassified from politics and play the role of observers, as is the case with the members of the OSD. Krasimir Premyanov [leader of BSP parliamentary group] said. He declared that it is impermissible to attempt to impose a view held by one part of the party on the entire party. In his opinion, the OSD has 263 members in the whole country, give or take 10.

Bulgaria: Finance Minister, MP's Discuss Budget Update

AU2307125996 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian
23 Jul 96 p 16

[24 CHASA staff report: "Minister Kostov: Lev May Rise in Value"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The lev will cease to fall, and may even rise, Finance Minister Dimitur Kostov told the Parliamentary Budget Commission yesterday.

The deputies have begun to consider updating the 1996 budget. The finance minister also believes that consumer prices should settle down following the shock surrounding the banking crisis.

The minister declared that the new budget figures are aimed at providing social protection for the victims of the structural reform. Budget receipts will rise by 144 billion leva. The municipalities are expected to provide

over 12 billion leva. The cost of interest payments on the internal debt will rise by 110 billion leva to a total of 232 billion leva. At the end of June, the internal debt was 488 billion leva.

Muravey Radev, deputy chairman of the Budget Commission, considered that at least a further 140 billion leva was needed for servicing the internal debt. He asserted that the general inflation was leaving the hospitals and education practically without funds.

An increase of 29 billion leva is earmarked for social insurance. The cost of salaries in the government departments financed from the budget alone will rise by 10 billion leva. According to the financial experts, the real decline of incomes will not exceed 11 percent.

Inflation will be between 100 and 105 percent, and the mean annual inflation will be between 60 and 70 percent.

The updated budget envisions a GDP of 1,505 trillion leva. Minister Kostov said that zero economic growth is most likely.

The relative share of the GDP per member of the population is really tragic in comparison with other states, Plamen Denchev of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] said. Conditions have to be created to encourage investments to escape from this situation. If necessary, we will amend the Law on Profits Tax, Denchev said.

Stefan Savov said that the government has been disregarding the cosmic leap in the foreign debt for several years now. The professor plaintively wondered where we will find the \$2.6 billion for the payments until 1998, whereas previously we paid \$30-40 million per year.

The Parliamentary Energy Commission proposes increasing the budget funds for nuclear safety at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant from 900 to 1,350 million leva. The present version of the budget amendments envisions cutting the funding for the nuclear plant from 900 to 700 million leva. If the commission's proposal is not accepted, there is a risk of electricity cuts in October and a stalling of the nuclear safety program, on which we have assumed a commitment to the world financial institutions. It is expected that the increase of funding for the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant will be compensated with the 3 million leva of extra revenues that that treasury expects to receive from fees for transit gas sent along the Yamburg gas pipeline.

Czech Republic: France's Millon on Membership in NATO

LD2307173096 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network
in Czech 1600 GMT 23 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] French Defense Minister Charles Millon, who is ending his two-day visit to the Czech Republic, had talks today with parliament Speaker Milos Zeman and Foreign Minister Jozef Zieleniec. He assured the two representatives of French support for NATO enlargement. He went on to say in an exclusive interview for Czech radio:

[Begin Millon recording, in French with superimposed Czech translation] We must now agree on a reliable procedure which would enable the Czech Republic to become a part of NATO. One has to say, however, that the Czech Republic will enter an alliance which is undergoing reform, and we will have to think about its organization and structure so that NATO might safeguard European security as well as possible.

In this connection, the Czech Republic should continue to be a democratic country, and should consider its future security with regard to its allies and with regard to the countries which might disturb the balance in the region.

The Czech Republic has performed its tasks within IFOR in a responsible way. This is evidence that you are taking part in European security and the building of a new Europe. [end recording]

Czech Republic: Foreign Ministry Official on NATO Membership

AU2307094596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES
in Czech 18 Jul 96 p 2

[Interview with Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra by Michal Mocek; place and date not given: "For America NATO Expansion Is a Fait Accompli, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra Claims"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—After a series of talks with U.S. politicians when visiting the United States last week, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra is convinced that there are no fundamental differences between the Republicans and the Democrats in the United States on the issue of eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance.

[Mocek] How do the positions of the Republicans and the Democrats in the United States differ on NATO expansion?

[Vondra] Both the Republicans and the Democrats plan the same thing—to expand the Alliance. Both parties

approach it as an expansion of the zone of stability, and they do not link it with either integration into the European Union, or with developments in Russia. At the same time, they emphasize the Central European countries, and in particular Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The only difference is that the Democrats perceive the process of expansion as being more open also for other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, the Republicans refer to the year 1998, while the Democrats speak unofficially about 1999.

[Mocek] Does that mean that the Republicans want just a limited expansion?

[Vondra] One cannot put it so categorically. Although the opposition Republicans refer to only three countries, the Administration, led by the Democrats, is responsible for U.S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, they are all interested in having a significant majority in favor of the final decision on the extent and date of the expansion. The Democrats themselves are preparing certain steps, which would be an answer to the Republican bill that commits the United States to pushing through the expansion of the Alliance.

[Mocek] Is it a different bill or an amendment to the original one?

[Vondra] I do not wish to specify this. The Democratic response takes into account the shift in the situation, however, and does not oppose it.

[Mocek] Did you gain your impression of the willingness to expand from talks with congressmen or also from talks with U.S. Government representatives?

[Vondra] Certainly also from the talks with members of President Clinton's Administration. It is perceived as a fait accompli practically everywhere.

[Mocek] So, Russia's negative attitude regarding the expansion of the Alliance does not play a major role for the United States?

[Vondra] The Russia factor does play a role but not to the point of changing the decision to expand the Alliance. Russia will certainly not decide that. Nevertheless, Moscow plays a role in the strategy of dual steps, when NATO emphasizes building up friendly relations with Russia in addition to the NATO expansion. After the Russian elections, the space opened for talks on the form of these relations. The dialogue with Russia is an element in the scenario. Nevertheless, it is not a factor that should prevent the expansion.

[Mocek] Slovakia seems to be omitted from the list of the most hopeful NATO-membership candidates. What does it mean for the Czech Republic?

[Vondra] It is in our fundamental interests for Slovakia to be in the same group as we are. We would prefer it if Slovakia did not close its path towards NATO. We also discussed this in the United States. I believe that the path is not yet completely closed for Slovakia.

[Mocek] As in the European Union, restructuring is being discussed in NATO, too. Is that an excuse for delaying expansion?

[Vondra] Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski, who was visiting Washington at the same time, and I asked the same thing in Washington. We were told that there is absolutely no connection between the completion of the restructuring and the acceptance of new countries into NATO.

[Mocek] Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas stated after talks in Brussels last week that it will not be only the Czech Army that will join NATO but the entire state. Is the state ready for this?

[Vondra] I believe that, in principle, it is ready. Of course, it is possible to point out various problems or the degree of readiness. Nevertheless, we decided on participation in IFOR [Implementation Force] last year, for instance, which was not of utmost interest for us. Parliament approved it, however, with a great majority. Regarding the Alliance, for us membership is of utmost interest.

[Mocek] Would you not agree that the entry of the entire state is a reason for a referendum?

[Vondra] I do not believe so. NATO is an association of sovereign states, where every decision must be made unanimously. Hence, it does not limit sovereignty. Of course, there are integrated military structures, but their activity must be preceded by a political decision. Moreover, no referendum on joining the Alliance has been conducted in any country.

Czech Republic: Amendment Creates, Dissolves Ministries

AU2307181296 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
19 Jul 96 p 2

[CTI report: "Law Amendment—New Ministries With New Powers; Changes in Sector Management"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The amendment to the jurisdiction bill, which was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies yesterday, assumes establishment of new ministries and defines their powers.

The jurisdiction bill amendment establishes a Ministry for the Development of Regions, Cities, and Communities of the Czech Republic, a Ministry of Transport and Communications of the Czech Republic, an Office

for the Protection of Competition, and an Office for the State Information System. At the same time, it terminates the Ministry of the Economy of the Czech Republic, the Ministry for the Economic Competition of the Czech Republic, the Ministry of Transport of the Czech Republic, the Czech Commission for Scientific Ranks, and the Office for Legislation. The powers of the outgoing state bodies are divided among the other ministries and offices.

The Ministry for the Development of Regions, Cities, and Communities is responsible particularly for housing issues, and therefore the relevant powers are transferred here from the Ministry of the Economy.

The new Ministry of Transport and Communications also assumes some powers of the Ministry of the Economy, and that in the matters of telecommunications and post. Vocational education, administered by the Ministry of the Economy so far, goes to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. The support for exports, raw-material policy, technological development, and some other powers concerning the economy move from the Ministry of the Economy to the Ministry of Industry and Trade.

The powers of the outgoing Office for Legislation are assumed, according to the government bill, by the Ministry of Justice. The powers of the terminated Czech Commission for Scientific Ranks are transferred to the Ministry of Education.

The remaining powers of the Ministry of the Economy are assumed by the newly established Office for the State Information System. The liquidated Ministry for the Economic Competition is substituted by the Office for the Protection of Competition under the continued management of Stanislav Belohradek (Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party). The duties of the aforementioned offices will be regulated by laws, the drafts of which were also submitted by the cabinet.

The powers of the minister without portfolio, that is, Pavel Bratinka (Civic Democratic Alliance), will be determined by the government. According to a preliminary agreement, the coordination of secret services, the Anti-Drug Commission, the Council for Nationalities, the Council for Foundations, and the Committee of Physically Handicapped should come under Bratinka.

The Chamber will discuss the jurisdiction bill amendment in its fourth session that will begin immediately after the conclusion of the third session, or by 26 July at the latest.

Czech Republic: Agreement on Church Restitution Amended

AU2207133496 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 18 Jul 96 p 4

["Full text" by "CTK" of "Amendment to Coalition Agreement on Termination of Restitution Activities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An amendment to the Coalition Agreement Between the Civic Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party, and the Civic Democratic Alliance on the Termination of the Restitution Activities in the Czech Republic signed by the chairmen of the coalition parties on 17 July 1996.

A special protocol regarding item 9 of the policy part of the Coalition Agreement signed on 27 June 1996:

Alleviation of Property-Related Wrongs and Conclusion of the Restitution Activities

The chairmen of the coalition parties confirm their joint interest in the conclusion of the restitution process in the Czech Republic. They see it as a necessary condition for stabilization of ownership relations and confirmation of property rights. They are aware of the necessity, prior to the so-called full stop to restitution, to alleviate the wrongs against both church and nonchurch legal persons, whose activity has been and is oriented towards activities beneficial to the public, which go beyond the benefit of their members and supporters. They confirm their intention to release the property held by the state to support their activity (by the facilities serving for activities beneficial to the public with the burden of ban from appropriation [zcizeni] for at least 10 years) with the goal of gradually removing the dependence of the church on the state.

The chairmen of the coalition parties reached an agreement that the final solution to the restitution activity would be, to the extent that is legally possible, entrusted to the government, which, upon agreement with the church and nonchurch organizations (through an offer from which they would choose), will evaluate it with regard to the public interest and consideration regarding the minimization of the claims against the state budget (without any claim for financial compensation for changes in the state of the property or lost revenues) according to these principles, and will release:

To all church legal persons:

—the buildings that served spiritual, pastoral, and administrative purposes or served as housing for the clergymen;

—forest land up to the amount claimed and the facilities serving for the management of this property located on this land.

To selected associations:

—buildings and facilities that served for publicly beneficial activities, which will be offered and released by the government wherever readiness is demonstrated to conduct publicly beneficial activities according to general rules, unless a serious public interest prevents it, and, in justified instances, the government will do so with a target burden (in exceptional cases, particularly those where the church has continuously conducted publicly beneficial activities in a facility that has been expropriated, this can also apply to churches);

To all aforementioned authorized persons:

—the land on which the buildings and facilities to be released stand or which belong to them according to the community subdivision [intravilan].

At the same time, no contribution will be provided beginning 1998 for the repair and maintenance of church monuments beyond the framework of the rights of other owners of cultural monuments, and for four years beginning 1998 (if the property is released in 1997), the state subsidy for religious activity will be gradually reduced by one-quarter (with the exception of those churches that would not be substantially affected by the property restitution).

The release of the property is, in addition to the aforementioned, subject to the condition that the authorized person:

—owned the relevant property on 25 February 1948;

—can provide evidence of a legal continuity between 26 February 1948 and 31 December 1992 or having conducted publicly beneficial activity at least until 25 February 1948, and from 1 January 1993 at the latest.

The chairmen of the coalition parties believe:

a. The government can offer the state property that satisfies the aforementioned principles individually to all legal persons, with the exception of churches, by 31 August 1996;

b. Legal (authorized) persons can exercise their claims according to these principles (the nonchurch authorized persons only from the offered list) by 31 October 1996;

c. The government will decide on the release by 31 December 1996;

d. The property can be released until 1 March 1997;

e. The government will table a bill containing the executed restitution measures by a government decision, which would confirm the conclusion of all restitution activities and abrogate all freezing measures by 31 December at the latest, and it will promote its adoption;

f. No taxes or administration fees connected with the release of the aforementioned property are to be levied;

g. The government will adopt a concept formulating general terms for the relations between the state and church. It will prepare the necessary executive and legal steps, which it will submit to parliament. The objective of the government is the independence of the church from the state.

The chairmen of the coalition parties keep in mind the suffering and the victims from the years 1948 to 1989, but they are also aware of the fact that there were many more wrongs committed at the time against the property, human rights, lives, natural and intellectual riches of our society than all the measures adopted to alleviate the impact of the lawlessness could hope to cover. Aware of this, they declare, upon the implementation of this agreement, the restitution activities and the process of alleviation of the wrongs in the Czech Republic concluded.

Czech Republic: Poll Shows More Confidence in Legislature

AU2307172096 *Prague PRAVO in Czech* 23 Jul 96
p 2

[Report by "sam": "IVVM—41 Percent of Respondents Trust the New Chamber"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—In the July IVVM [Institute for Public Opinion Research] survey, 41 percent of those asked expressed their confidence in the new Chamber of Deputies. Mistrust was expressed by 32 percent, and 27 percent of the respondents did not know. Our newspaper received the results of the survey of 983 respondents on Monday.

Confidence is markedly higher than in the past term of office: The former Chamber was trusted in past years by between 25 and 31 percent of citizens. An exception was the period immediately after the elections in 1992 (as much as 49 percent trusted the then Czech National Council) and at the very beginning of the existence of the independent Czech Republic (in February 1993 it was 46 percent).

According to the IVVM, the popularity of the Chamber rose, above all, among the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party voters (from 29 percent to 40 percent of trust) and among the Czech Social Democratic Party voters (from 18 percent to 54 percent).

Czech Republic: Opposition Conciliatory Toward Government

LD2407120596 *Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech* 1100 GMT 24 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The debate in parliament on the new government's policy statement is still continuing. Vladimir Hruby reports from parliament.

[Hruby] [passage omitted] Parliament Speaker Milos Zeman spoke earlier. Despite his reservations regarding the government statement and the cabinet personnel, Zeman indicated the possibility that Klaus' cabinet could be tolerated [by the Czech Social Democratic Party, CSSD].

[Begin Zeman recording] A very simple and transparent solution is taking shape: to voice no confidence in this government. I am honest in saying that this government does not have my personal trust. However, we have to ask ourselves another question: what will happen next?

In my view, it would be honest if the CSSD would not put a mark or a label on people and if it were to endeavor, in order to push through its policies in this chamber, to achieve concrete and businesslike cooperation on specific problems with all political parties interested in it. [end recording]

[Hruby] The legislators will continue their debate on the government statement at 1400, after the break.

Czech Republic: Social Democrats To Reject Policy Statement

LD2307203596 *Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech* 1900 GMT 23 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus today submitted the government policy statement to parliament. When speaking about his minority government's social policy, he said:

[Begin Klaus recording] The government will work on the fine-tuning of the system of social security benefits and on simplifying the administration procedures connected with the granting and payment of benefits without abandoning the principle of means-testing.

The government will ensure stricter control of payments of all kinds of social security benefits and will strengthen the role of towns and villages in making decisions about welfare benefits and their implementation.

In the sphere of social services, the government will continue, under clearly set conditions, to support the activities of private, humanitarian, and church organizations with the aim of increasing the already existing supply of these services. [end recording]

Shortly after Klaus had finished delivering the policy statement the session was adjourned until 0900 tomorrow morning at the request of the Social Democrats.

The Social Democrats will make a decision on their support for the government tomorrow morning. According to the party chairman Milos Zeman, the decision will be made before the beginning of the parliamentary session.

However, Zeman also said that it was now already certain that there would not be a single deputy in the Social Democratic Party who would vote for the government.

Czech Republic: CSSD Leader Urges Toleration of New Government

LD2407111896 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 24 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Developments in parliament, where a debate on the new government's policy statement continues, have attracted exceptional attention today. Vladimir Hruby reports live from parliament:

[Hruby] About 20 deputies, mostly from the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] have spoken in the three-hour debate so far. [passage omitted] The last Social Democrat who took part in the debate was its chairman, Milos Zeman.

[Begin Zeman recording] I could list a number of points I like in the government policy statement. However, I will immediately ask myself a sceptical question. The new government included some of these points in its previous policy statement. At the same time, these points were clearly not fulfilled. Where is the guarantee that it will fulfill them now? [end recording]

[Hruby] Despite these doubts, Milos Zeman said the new government should be tolerated.

Deputies from Sladek's party [the Association for the Republic—Republican Party of Czechoslovakia] are taking part in the debate now. The final vote of confidence in the government can be expected this afternoon.

Czech Republic: CSSD Objects to State Funding of Daily

AU2307081496 Prague PRAVO in Czech 22 Jul 96
p 2

[Report by "zr, CTI": "Zeman Would Have the State Share in Financing DENNI TELEGRAF Investigated"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague (CTI)—Financing the DENNI TELEGRAF daily from the state funds could be regarded as a crime of misusing these funds. The prosecution of this affair could be initiated by a parliamentary investigation commission, said Milos Zeman, chairman of the Chamber and the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD], in response to a CTI question.

"The CSSD has several times pointed out that because of its many outstanding issues and the low circulation, DENNI TELEGRAF is in fact financed from taxpayers' pockets," Zeman said.

DENNI TELEGRAF, which Vaclav Klaus described once as the paper closest to the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], is published by Integra Co., a subsidiary of the Investicni a Postovni Banka, in which the state holds approximately one-third stake. The publisher, as opposed to most of the others, does not publish any data on the circulation and outstanding issues.

A parliamentary commission "for investigating matters of public interest" can be formed if at least 40 deputies so decide.

Slovakia: Poll Examines Ethnic Relations in Southern Slovakia

AU1807155896 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 17 Jul 96 p 5

[Article by Dana Soucova from the Slovak Statistical Office Institute for Public Opinion Research: "Good Relations Prevail in the Communities of Southern Slovakia, But One-Third of Inhabitants Fear a Conflict"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From the viewpoint of Slovakia's global foreign policy strategy, which dwells in the creation of conditions for integration into European and euro-atlantic structures, great importance is being ascribed to the ethnic minorities issue. At the forefront of attention are Slovak-Hungarian relations, which are being viewed as a potential source of ethnic misunderstandings.

With the founding of the independent Slovak Republic, Hungarians started to show apprehension about the preservation of their own ethnic identity. This situation has produced what can be said to be permanent discussions, polemics, and controversies among the political representatives of both sides regarding various aspects of the Hungarian ethnic minority's status in the Slovak Republic.

Fifth Public Opinion Survey

Among Slovaks and Hungarians living in Slovakia, the ethnic conflict can be identified as a clash of interests between two groups, both of which insist on the realization of their ideas about the application of minority rights, while these ideas occasionally considerably differ or are absolutely contradictory.

The way of thinking of citizens of Slovak and Hungarian nationalities inhabiting for a long time the same territory, though under changing sociopolitical and territorial setups, can serve as not only an interesting, but also an important piece of knowledge about the genuine problems of citizens in an ethnically heterogeneous region.

The Institute of Public Opinion Research (UVVM) operating under the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic has been conducting probes into the views of both the Slovak and ethnic Hungarian inhabitants of the ethnically mixed districts of southern Slovakia since 1990.

Mutual Relations

The fifth UVVM survey with such an objective was carried out in April and involved 630 Slovaks and 634 citizens of Hungarian nationality aged 18 to 69. The controlled variables were sex, age, nationality, size of the community of residence, level of education, and region. This article reproduces basic conclusions from the extensive empirical material obtained by the survey. As has become traditional, respondents evaluated relations between Slovaks and citizens of Hungarian nationality in their own village or town as good. Among Slovaks, this assessment (sum total of the replies "good" and "more good than bad") ranges from 74 percent in 1990 to 89 percent at present. Citizens of Hungarian nationality assess the relations as being even slightly better: [the sum total of the replies "good" and "more good than bad" increased] from 85 percent in 1990 to 91 percent at present.

Relations Between Slovaks and Citizens of Hungarian Nationality in Southern Slovakia

	1990	1993	1994	1996
	Percent			
Slovaks				
Good	36	57	52	56
More good than bad	38	31	33	33
More bad than good	14	5	10	6
Bad	7	1	1	1
Do not know	5	6	4	4
Citizens of Hungarian nationality				
Good	48	54	48	58

	1990	1993	1994	1996
More good than bad	37	40	46	33
More bad than good	8	4	4	7
Bad	1	1	1	1
Do not know	6	2	1	1

Both samples confirmed, furthermore, that good mutual relations among citizens of the two nationalities under review are more characteristic of villages with up to 2,000 citizens (Slovaks 93 percent, citizens of Hungarian nationality 94 percent) than of larger settlement agglomerations, and of western Slovakia (Slovaks 91 percent, citizens of Hungarian nationality 94 percent). The most frequent occurrence of the replies "more bad than good" and "bad" was to be found among respondents of Hungarian nationality in the central Slovak region (14 percent).

Asked whether mutual relations between members of the two nationalities have improved or deteriorated over

the previous year, three-quarters of both the polled Slovaks and citizens of Hungarian nationality replied that they have not changed.

Ethnic Tension

To ascertain in greater detail the opinions about existing mutual relations in ethnically mixed communities, the UVVM made use of some statements to be found in society that can indicate the existence of ethnic tension. Attitudes toward tension between Slovaks and citizens of Hungarian nationality are illustrated by the following chart:

"There is permanent tension between Slovaks and citizens of Hungarian nationality living in southern Slovakia"		
	Slovaks	Citizens of Hungarian Nationality
	Percent	
Agree	12	5
Agree more than disagree	20	20
Disagree more than agree	33	32
Disagree	24	34
Do not know	11	9

The germs of ethnic tension, though inconspicuous in the initial stages, can, under conditions supporting their proliferation, assume unfathomable dimensions. This is documented by the growth of ethnic conflicts into protracted nationality warfare in some nearby

postcommunist countries. Views on the possibility of a similar situation emerging in southern Slovakia, based on the development of relations between Slovaks and citizens of Hungarian nationality, are expressed by the data in the following chart:

Do you or do you not fear that relations between Slovaks and citizens of Hungarian nationality in southern Slovakia could escalate to such a degree that acts of violence similar to those in the former Yugoslavia might occur?		
	1994	1996
	Percent	
Slovaks		
Definitely fear	11	10
Rather fear	32	20

Do you or do you not fear that relations between Slovaks and citizens of Hungarian nationality in southern Slovakia could escalate to such a degree that acts of violence similar to those in the former Yugoslavia might occur?

Rather not fear	34	34
Definitely do not fear	20	30
Do not know	3	6
Citizens of Hungarian Nationality		
Definitely fear	11	10
Rather fear	29	19
Rather not fear	29	31
Definitely do not fear	26	32
Do not know	5	8

Despite the decline in the number of replies expressing fear of a potential escalation of mutual relations between Slovaks and citizens of Hungarian nationality living in southern Slovakia compared with the 1994 survey, the fact that three out of 10 Slovaks and three out of 10 ethnic Hungarians concede this possibility at present (sum total of the replies "definitely fear" and "rather fear") is worth pondering. A relatively greater number of replies expressing fear were registered by the survey in the group of respondents of Hungarian nationality [living] among Slovaks in communities with up to 2,000 citizens (35 percent).

An important piece of information yielded by the survey concerns the respondents' reaction to the statement that "an ordinary Slovak and an ordinary Hungarian have always come to an agreement, and will do so also in the future."

"An ordinary Slovak and an ordinary Hungarian have always come to an agreement and will do so also in the future"

	Slovaks	Citizens of Hungarian Nationality
	Percent	
Agree	63	66
Agree more than disagree	30	27
Disagree more than agree	3	3
Disagree	2	1
Do not know	2	3

Regarding the solution of potential misunderstandings between the two ethnic groups at the so-called grass-roots level, between rank-and-file citizens, an accommodating attitude manifested itself among the absolute majority of respondents of both sample groups—among 93 percent of Slovaks and 94 percent of citizens of Hungarian nationality (sum total of the replies "agree" and "agree more than disagree"). The data presented is not differentiated according to any sociodemographic parameter in either sample under review.

Mutual Tolerance

Attitudes toward another opinion that is to be found in society, namely that "Hungarians living in Slovakia are steadily escalating their demands," illustrate the proportion of Slovaks who have certain reservations about the appearances of some representatives of the Hungarian minority in the public:

"Hungarians living in Slovakia are steadily escalating their demands" (Slovak response)

	Percent	
	1994	1996
Fully agree	56	27
Agree more than disagree	28	31
Disagree more than agree	10	20
Fully disagree	3	10
Do not know	3	12

A total of 58 percent of Slovaks identify at present with the view that Hungarians in Slovakia are continuously stepping up their demands (sum total of the replies "fully agree" and "agree more than disagree"), which is 26 percent less than in 1994.

Ethnic Minority Rights

Articles 33 and 34 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic enshrine the rights of national minorities and ethnic groups living on the territory of Slovakia.

Views on the observance of those rights have been surveyed periodically. The comparative results show an overall decline in the number of positive evaluations of the current state of observance of ethnic minority rights of the Hungarian community in Slovakia, compared with 1993. The surveys have repeatedly registered a more positive evaluation of the observance of the ethnic minorities' rights from the Slovaks' perspective than in the perspective of citizens of Hungarian nationality. This year's survey registered a significant decline in the number of positive replies among the replies of respondents of Hungarian nationality compared with 1993, in the following order:

Assessment of the right to develop their own culture (27 percent decline in the number of positive replies, to 54 percent); the right to participate in the solution of affairs regarding ethnic minorities (21 percent decline, to 30 percent); the right to set up and maintain their own educational and cultural institutions (20 percent decline, to 44 percent); the right to disseminate and receive information in their own mother tongue (18 percent decline, to 58 percent); the right to associate in minority organizations (17 percent decline, to 64 percent); and the right to education in their own mother tongue (12 percent decline, to 64 percent).

Views on Self-Administration

To ascertain the position of Slovaks or citizens of Hungarian nationality in the ethnically mixed areas of Slovakia's territory from the viewpoint of the stability or endangerment of their ethnic identity and the level of tolerance toward the demands of members of the Hungarian minority for various types of self-administration, the survey applied the method of statements with which the respondents were able to identify or which they could reject. Based on their replies, it is possible to state the following:

Compared with 1993, there has been a significant decline (from 50 to 36 percent) in the proportion of Slovaks who identified with the statement that they are facing the threat of assimilation in the ethnically mixed areas of the Slovak Republic's territory. The

proportion of Slovaks who believe that the Hungarians living in the ethnically mixed territories are facing the threat of assimilation has remained at the same, relatively stable level (13 percent in 1993, 12 percent in 1996). The proportion of Slovaks who are of the opinion that the Hungarian minority has a right to autonomy in the sphere of education and culture has also remained at approximately the same level (22-25 percent). The proportion of Slovaks who endorsed the statement that the Hungarian minority should have the right to territorial autonomy has increased almost twofold, compared with 1993, and comes close to one-fifth of the surveyed sample (having increased from 9 to 17 percent).

In the sample of respondents of Hungarian nationality, the number of those who identified with the statement that the Slovaks are facing the threat of assimilation has declined by one-half since 1993. The number of citizens of the Hungarian community who believe that Hungarians in the Slovak Republic are threatened with assimilation is at present 9 percent higher [than in 1993]. Support for the idea of the Hungarian minority's right to self-administration in the sphere of education and culture has remained at roughly the same level (75 and 78 percent), while the proportion of advocates of the idea of recognizing the Hungarian minority's right to territorial autonomy in areas where it represents the majority has increased (from 61 to 70 percent).

Reactions by respondents of both nationalities to statements about the Hungarian minority's irredentist plans are illustrated by the following chart [all figures in the table below are as published; these figures are inconsistent with the pie charts they accompany]:

"The Hungarian minority would prefer southern Slovakia annexed to Hungary"		
	1994	1996
	Percent	
Slovaks		
Agree	32	20
Agree more than disagree	34	34
Disagree more than agree	20	30
Disagree	3	6
Do not know	11	10
Citizens of Hungarian Nationality		
Agree	11	10

"The Hungarian minority would prefer southern Slovakia annexed to Hungary"

Agree more than disagree	29	19
Disagree more than agree	29	31
Disagree	26	32
Do not know	5	8

While the above statement was endorsed in this year's survey by almost one-half of Slovaks (19 percent fewer than in 1994), the attitudes of citizens of the Hungarian nationality in the 1994 and 1996 surveys show no change, with two-thirds of those polled rejecting the statement.

Ties of Kinship

Relations between citizens of Slovak and Hungarian nationalities living in Slovakia's southern districts that arise from ties of kinship are documented by the following data:

In this year's survey, about one-third of both the polled Slovaks and polled citizens of Hungarian nationality declared that they had close relatives belonging to the other nationality, which undoubtedly influences models of conduct toward the other ethnic group. The findings from a correlative analysis have been confirmed, according to which Slovaks who have among their close relatives citizens of Hungarian nationality more frequently than other Slovaks:

—hold the view that Slovaks living in the ethnically mixed areas are not facing the threat of assimilation;

—are of the opinion that citizens of Hungarian nationality have the right to self-administration in educational and cultural matters, but also to territorial self-administration;

—do not come across haughty or hostile behavior on the part of citizens of Hungarian nationality in their village or town;

—consider Hungarians living in Slovakia to be their partners in building the common homeland;

—disagree with the statement that the Hungarian minority would like to annex southern Slovakia to Hungary;

—hold the view that no permanent tension exists between Slovaks and citizens of Hungarian nationality;

—hold the view that an ordinary Slovak and an ordinary Hungarian have always come to an agreement, and will do so in the future;

—regard the basic treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic as a definite contribution to good mutual relations.

Respondents of Hungarian nationality with Slovak relatives subscribe more frequently than others to the views that:

—Hungarians living in the ethnically mixed areas are not facing the threat of assimilation with the Slovaks;

—Slovaks consider citizens of Hungarian nationality to be their partners in building the common homeland.

Basic Treaty Between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic

The atmosphere that preceded the ratification of the basic interstate treaty by the National Council of the Slovak Republic undoubtedly had an affect on the general public. One of the goals of the survey, therefore, was to obtain an idea of the views of citizens of the pertinent region regarding the contribution of the treaty. The reaction by the ethnically mixed population to the treaty was surveyed by means of a statement, on which the respondents were asked to deliver their opinion.

"The basic treaty on good neighborly relations and friendly cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic is an important contribution to good mutual relations between the two states"

	Slovaks	Respondents of Hungarian Nationality
	Percent	
Definitely agree	52	46
Agree more than disagree	32	35
Disagree more than agree	5	6

"The basic treaty on good neighborly relations and friendly cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic is an important contribution to good mutual relations between the two states"

Definitely disagree	1	2
Unable to assess the issue	10	11

The overwhelming majority of citizens from the ethnically mixed areas of southern Slovakia (more than four-fifths), Slovaks and Hungarians alike, consider the interstate treaty between the Slovak Republic and the

Hungarian Republic to be a relevant step toward improving mutual relations.

Hungary: Finance Ministry Expects Economy To Improve

AU2207143296 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 19 Jul 96 p 5

[Report by unidentified correspondent: "Finance Ministry Expects Improving Performance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In its report prepared at the beginning of this year, the Economic Research Institute predicted that economic growth would slow down in the first months of 1996, or it would even decrease so, in their view, the GDP cannot increase more than 1 percent by the end of this year. However, the Finance Ministry is still counting on a GDP increase of close to 2 percent this year. As Finance Minister Peter Medgyessy said earlier, while last year's 2 percent GDP increase took place along with a quarterly decrease in overall national production, this year we can count on a steadily increasing economic performance every three months. He also pointed out that one cannot see this increase in the first quarter figures because the 1995 GDP was the highest in the first quarter of 1995.

Gyula Hegedus of the Economic Research Institute told us industry and telecommunications registered the highest growth in the second half of 1995; in other areas, one only noticed a very slight improvement compared with the previous year. The general recession in the first quarter of 1996 showed a similar trend: this recession was less discernible in industry and telecommunications than in other sectors. The Economic Research Institute predicts a stagnation in economic growth for the first half of 1996, and a slight increase in the GDP for the second half of 1996. Restricted domestic consumption, the restrictive measures, official price increases, and the decrease in real wages all justify the aforementioned predictions. Although the exports grew, they did not grow to an extent that could counterbalance the drop in domestic consumption. For economic growth, exports should increase by at least 30 percent.

Although there has been an increase in investments, profits have not been used for further development, and this is the big problem of our economy according to the institute. Only an increase in investments of 8-10 percent in 1996 would contribute to a GDP increase. According to Gyula Hegedus, we can only attain growth if both the domestic and foreign markets are properly controlled. A sudden increase in exports or imports could destroy the hard-fought balance.

According to Hungarian National Bank [MNB] figures, consumer prices increased by an average of 26.2 percent in the first five months of 1996, compared with the same period of 1995. Half of this increase was the result of

central or local government measures. Food prices only increased by 0.8 percent in May, while the prices of other goods increased by 2.6 percent compared with the previous month. Household energy prices increased considerably, by some 8.6 percent. The March increase in the prices of natural gas and electric energy played a big role in all this.

Agricultural procurement prices increased by 18.5 percent compared with last year. The prices of industrial goods increased considerably; namely by 24.1 percent, compared with last year figures. The prices of goods for export increased by 24.6 percent.

The central budget deficit stood at 91 billion forints [Ft] at the end of May 1996. In order to avoid an exaggerated increase in this deficit, we will need a strict budget management in the remaining months of this year. We can only counterbalance the higher-than-planned social security deficit (Ft25 billion) with a more favorable situation of the central budget. So far, the budget has had a surplus income from customs payments, but there are delays now in the inflow of population and consumer taxes.

Interest continued to decrease in April. The average interest on one-month and three-months treasury bonds stood between 23.8-24.3 percent, while interbank interest stood between 24-25 percent. Interest on enterprise credits also decreased, and stood between 28.7-29.7 percent.

Hungary: FKGP's Torgyan Says Party Ready To Assume Power

AU2207111096 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 13 Jul 96 p 5

[Interview with Independent Smallholders' Party Chairman Jozsef Torgyan by Lorinc Szendrei; place and date not given: "Preparations To Defeat the Socialists"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Szendrei] Gyula Horn's cabinet has reached half time. How do the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP] and Jozsef Torgyan evaluate the activity of this government so far?

[Torgyan] The government activity is focusing on dismantling everything that the previous government had built up. I had a rather critical stand toward the activity of the previous government as well, but at least they started something. The series of personnel changes is perhaps the most painful thing. The present government not only established its own clientele, but also restored the state-party key figures in their former positions or even better positions than before. I see a revival of state-party stereotypes in the activity of the Horn cabinet; but, at the same time, they failed to

carry out the restructuring of our industry. The Horn cabinet has failed to create the bases of the promised socioeconomic reform. Although they say that they have started to reform our state administration, the necessary economic, political, and legal changes have failed to materialize. Thus, Hungary's general crisis situation continues to deepen under the Horn cabinet.

[Szendrei] State administration reform would have to be carried out even if the FKGP had been in power, and society feels this as a series of strong economic restrictions. How would you do this?

[Torgyan] Let me remind you that the FKGP had already declared the need for state administration reform many years ago, but we said that we must first modernize the economy in order to be able to carry out this reform. There are many kinds of priorities in the economy. In our alternative economic program, we outlined most of these priorities. One should not select some of these priorities and forget about others, because we must touch almost every area of economic and state activity. There is a general crisis in our foreign policy, domestic policy, agricultural policy, and food industry. We are also having a crisis in our legislature, land registration, credit system, and banking system. We are also facing a moral crisis. [passage omitted]

[Szendrei] This government has often been criticized for disregarding the population's tolerance level when dealing with the obligations accepted in the international financial world. To what extent would the FKGP change this policy?

[Torgyan] We must assert our national interests much more strongly. All the more so because huge masses outside the mother country are interested in this, masses of people who were stripped of their Hungarian citizenship while never leaving their homes. We say that we must guarantee an offensive trend for the Hungarians spread all over the world, instead of the current defensive trend. We believe in this and in the Hungarian way.

[Szendrei] So, how should we deal with the international financial world?

[Torgyan] We should create a financial center in Budapest, one that would mean competition for both the West and the East, a center in which, in addition to Western capital, Eastern, Asian, and Far-Eastern capital would also appear. [passage omitted]

[Szendrei] In your opinion, what will the next two years be like? What will your strategy be?

[Torgyan] Hungary's general crisis will continue, and an intense struggle will develop within the coalition. The FKGP has begun preparing for government. We will set up various cabinet systems and will compare the various sector programs with the alternative economic program, and we have started searching for persons who can carry this policy out. We are a big historical party, one that will have to defeat the Hungarian Socialist Party, a party that has expanded tremendously in the past decades.

B-H: Muratovic Sees 'Slow Realization' of 'Promised Donations'

AU2307182796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 23 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today received Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos and aides. During the meeting, particular attention was devoted to the situation in Mostar following local elections and the realization of the reconstruction program.

Minister Muratovic pointed out that thanks to their influence on local authorities, war profiteers were continuing to hinder the realization of election results. It was stressed that more pressure was needed to see that the newly elected Mostar authorities are constituted [words indistinct] on the general elections in September. The prime minister stressed that the EU presence in Mostar would be needed until fundamental changes in the political situation of the city take place.

Minister Muratovic then proceeded to brief Minister Poos with the problems of the country's economic reconstruction. He particularly stressed the slow realization of the promised donations. The prime minister stressed that economic revival was the only way to lasting peace and stability, and pointed out that greater engagement by European governments was needed to persuade people to invest in Bosnia's economy.

B-H: Izetbegovic, Luxembourg FM View Elections, Freedom of Media

AU2307175796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 23 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, today received Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos. President Izetbegovic acquainted his guest with the current political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with particular stress on the Croatian Democratic Community's [HDZ] refusal to accept the results of Mostar elections.

Minister Poos said that the HDZ's obstruction of the work of the Mostar City Council was unacceptable, as was the continued existence of the government of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia.

Izetbegovic conveyed to Foreign Minister Poos the Bosnian Government's stance that all war criminals must be arrested [words indistinct]. Commenting on the atmosphere before the September elections, Izetbegovic said that conditions for elections had not yet been met. [Words indistinct] Serb Republic [RS] where there is a danger of the situation staying as it is.

President Izetbegovic and Minister Poos devoted a part of the meeting to the media, and concluded that all OSCE standards for elections had been met on the territory controlled by the legitimate Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities, but that efforts should be stepped up to introduce freedom of the media in the RS and the part of the Federation controlled by the Croatian Defense Council.

B-H: Dervisbegovic, Luxembourg's Poos Discuss Election Planning

AU2307152496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Jul 96

[Report by Senada Cumurovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] After 40 minutes of talks, [Bosnian Deputy Foreign Minister] Dr. Dervisbegovic gave a short statement expressing his satisfaction with the visit. He also revealed the main topic of the talks with the Luxembourg Foreign Minister [Jacques Poos].

[Begin Dervisbegovic recording] We can say that Luxembourg has contributed greatly in terms of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, that a large number of [words indistinct], and that it is investing a great deal of funds into reconstruction in Bosnia. The minister also expressed interest in implementation of the Dayton accord, primarily as regards the elections, and we exchanged information about this issue. [end recording]

Foreign Minister Jacques Poos devoted particular attention to the significance of the forthcoming elections.

[Begin Poos recording, in English fading into superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] This is my first visit to Bosnia, but as foreign minister I have been present at many meetings over the past five years which focused on Bosnia and aid for the country. I believe this is a very important—perhaps even dangerous—period while elections are being organized. These elections are perhaps the most complicated in the world, and we will do everything to see that they are as free and fair as possible. I am certain that the Bosnian Government, the EU, and the international community, particularly the OSCE, share this goal. Luxembourg will be satisfied if the elections go as planned, and we hope they will bring new people who will look to the future. [end recording]

B-H: Ganic, Menzies 'Optimistic' on Results of Belgrade Talks

AU2307142396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Jul 96

[Statements by Ejup Ganic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and Federation vice president,

and U.S. Ambassador John Menzies, in Sarajevo on 23 Jul—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ganic in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] This is a very risky step for me as a politician, but a very safe step for Bosnia. That is how I see it. We have always taken the first step when it comes to a multiethnic Bosnia. As a multiethnic country, the region must take into account all the ideas and proposals made by our friends, and it must move forward. In the meantime, we are doing everything to adhere to the Dayton accord. We want stability in the region, and that is precisely the objective of my trip, that is, long-term stability in the Balkans as a part of Europe. What else can I say? It is possible that we shall discuss other controversial issues.

[Menzies in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] This is a historic visit for various reasons. This is the first high-level visit to Belgrade, and high-level negotiations will be held. We hope that [words indistinct] links will be established, and we hope that diplomatic and political relations will evolve from here. We are optimistic regarding the results. We are aware of the difficulties which have hindered such negotiations in the past, but we admire the Bosnia-Herzegovina representatives for the courage they exhibited in taking this step. We hope that the talks will be a success.

B-H: Assembly Chairman Ljubic Interviewed on Federation Issues

AU1907112196 Sarajevo HRVATSKA RIJEC
in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jul 96 p 3

[Interview with Mariofil Ljubic, chairman of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Zlatko Tulic; place and date not given: "The Coat of Arms and Flag of the Federation Are Coming Soon!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Tulic] How do you evaluate the work of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina up to now?

[Ljubic] The Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has had 15 sessions. I evaluate the work of the Assembly up so far, in view of the circumstances under which it has worked, as successful. The Assembly started work immediately after the war in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Much time and patience was needed to come from a time of war to a state of peace and tolerance and so I believe that the Constituent Assembly has done its job, as far as that was possible in times like these.

[Tulic] How great is the autonomy of the representatives and leadership of the Assembly? Are there any political

pressures on your work and where do they come from? What are your experiences in this regard?

[Ljubic] The autonomy of the representatives is mirrored both in their work in the Assembly and on the ground. As for pressures, they exist and they come from individual factors, but we as representatives do not feel them. On the other hand, it is logical that the representative of an area, for example a region or a municipality, has the mandate to represent the people from that area. After the signing of the Washington agreement, the representatives primarily represent the interests of the people from whom they come. The leadership of the Assembly has the necessary autonomy and it can lead the Assembly in accordance within the rules of procedure and constitutional competences derived from the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In a period of stable peace, the representatives will be able to carry out their work much more easily and independently. But we can be pleased with the present way of work.

Different Concepts of Accepting the Federation

[Tulic] Do you believe that the Constituent Assembly fulfills the tasks that it has been given by the Dayton agreement and what is the situation concerning the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina like?

[Ljubic] After the Dayton agreement we expedited the rhythm of work of the Constituent Assembly and the passing of laws that are very important for the implementation of the Federation. It is logical that not all the laws that we have passed could be enforced on the ground, because this is a very complicated system of power and it is still burdened by the recent war events and particularly by different approaches and concepts of interpreting the Federation and the solution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Concerning the positions of the Croatian people, the goal is equality in the Federation. In view of the experiences from the previous system, it is very important to have an equal position, constitutionally and formally. As for relations with the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it should have less jurisdiction because the Constituent Assembly controls the entire territory of the Federation and it is logical that the laws and regulations of the Federation are in force on that territory.

[Tulic] Have relations between the Assemblies of the Republic and the Federation been solved in an appropriate way, in the sense of taking over jurisdiction for decisionmaking on concrete issues?

[Ljubic] When we speak about the present time, there are no conflicts over jurisdiction between the two assemblies, but that had been the case before the Dayton agreement. The differentiation of the jurisdiction of the

two assemblies is both in the interest of the Federation and of the Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Tulic] What happened on the Defense Law? Why has it not been passed?

[Ljubic] Passing the Defense Law is an obligation that the Constituent Assembly took upon itself last December. After several debates, work on it was withdrawn and the coordination in committees of the Government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and at higher political levels was continued. There are two issues on which the sides could not agree: First the military service of recruits, because a condition of equality is for every recruit to have the right to choose in which component of the Federation forces he should serve; another important problem is the command and the appointment of officers. The biggest guarantee for the Croatian people is precisely the military component represented by the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. That was why the coordination has taken a long time: Until the doubts concerning these questions are removed. Some things have been solved provisionally, but there are still some talks on the provisions of the defense law to be carried out.

[Tulic] What do you personally see as the reason for the Bosniaks' previous refusal to accept the Defense Law?

[Ljubic] There were two different concepts of the organization of the Army of the Federation. The Bosniak side preferred the model of the former Yugoslav Army, which is absolutely wrong because we know what that army did to us. That is why for this model of the Federation forces it is necessary to have two army components with a coordinated command, because it can only function in that way. That was best shown in the last operations—during the liberation of territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina; so these two army components can act together quite successfully.

[Tulic] How will the provision reached through U.S. mediation, namely, that the Defense Law will be in force until the elections, be enforced procedurally?

[Ljubic] There are some provisions solved in a compromise way, in the first place concerning the command over the army components. Namely, until the elections there is the compromise solution that the HVO will be commanded by Federation President Kresimir Zubak and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army by President of the Presidency Alija Izetbegovic. The Dayton agreement provision on civilian command was interpreted incorrectly, precisely on the jurisdiction of the future tripartite presidency. Those are the things that are still to be discussed. The position of the Croatian side is that the posts of the president and the vice president of the Fed-

eration cannot be lost after the elections, which means that not all the jurisdiction should be transferred to the tripartite presidency.

The Dayton Agreement Must Be Implemented

[Tulic] What about the adoption of Federation symbols?

[Ljubic] After we carried out a tender for the flag and the coat of arms eleven proposals were selected; then the Sarajevo agreement came, which produced a proposal that was accepted and it was expected to get the support of the Assembly. But, as you know, no decision has been made as yet. The conclusion was that the solution should be found from the existing works and the proposal from the Sarajevo agreement. These days the work on this question is being intensified. We have one solution that the commission has offered and I believe that with certain corrections it could soon come to an agreement. For the time being there is a high degree of agreement concerning national symbols and, if everything goes well, this issue could come before the Constituent Assembly at the next session.

[Tulic] Not all the laws which have already been passed are really being respected, for example, the Law on Internal Affairs. What can the Assembly do to change that?

[Ljubic] As for the lack of implementation of laws in general, until now there have been no authorities that could implement all the Federation regulations. The same goes for the Law on Internal Affairs. It is important to form all the institutions at all levels, starting from municipalities and cantons, because that is the infrastructure that can enforce Federation regulations. The Law on Internal Affairs is one of the most important laws. Therefore, the completion of the organization in the cantons will create the preconditions for it to be more decisively enforced, because most work in this field must be done at the level of the cantons.

[Tulic] What do you believe the coming elections could bring? What do you personally expect, both politically and personally?

[Ljubic] It would be good if the elections were held at the scheduled time. Looking at this composition of the Assembly, which has been active for six years, it is high time for the election of people with a stronger mandate, who will enforce the decisions from the Dayton Agreement. I expect the elections to go well and the citizens to choose those who they believe will represent them best. In future I expect institutions of the Federation to start fully functioning and all aspects of the Dayton agreement to be implemented.

B-H: Commentary Cites Regional Interference in Internal Affairs

LD2007174896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 20 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton peace agreement and the establishment of permanent regional peace and democracy will be achieved with difficulty as long as Bosnia-Herzegovina's neighbors—Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro—interfere in the affairs of another state, namely, sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. Concern for compatriots in another state is one thing, and [words indistinct] for interference and intervention instead of good-neighborly relations is a completely different thing. Here is a commentary by Mehmedalija Sisic:

[Begin Sisic recording] In the case of international and interstate relations, a lot of noise is raised [words indistinct] when just one fishing boat strays into the territorial waters of another state. This results in a large-scale international incident. Of course, this is in line with the elementary, civilized right to respect neighbors. [sentence as heard]

However, this elementary international right and rule seems to be disregarded on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Neighbors are violating it in any possible way. The precedent was established at the time of international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, and all this has been observed calmly.

One gets the impression that Bosnia-Herzegovina diplomats on the East River at the United Nations should be more forceful because all arguments are on the side of sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. Aggression, war, and its resolution cannot be the reason for silence on this issue. On the contrary, this tolerance of four years of direct interference into our internal affairs by our neighbors only hinders the peace process and the establishment of trust, cooperation, democracy, trade, economic, and all other forms of cooperation in this part of Europe and the world.

There are numerous examples. In the beginning, there was a direct armed aggression by the eastern neighbors, Serbia and Montenegro, and units of the western neighbor, Croatia, that entered Bosnia via Mostar and Prozor, and all the way to central Bosnia. The installation of bodies of power, the forced and illegal introduction of foreign currencies, the Yugo dinar and Croatian kuna, and flags, symbols, and electronic media beamed from other countries. Let us not mention all other examples [words indistinct].

And now, before the elections, it is [?tragic] that nothing has changed in the political sense.

While attention is being focused on Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, the question must be asked how much the others in this party [Serb Democratic Party, SDS], and in other registered parties taking part in the elections want to see peace, freedom of movement, and real democracy, because with the exception of some of them, they are direct successors of the policy of annexation of large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and some parties don't even have the word Bosnia-Herzegovina in their name.

Unfortunately, there is not much difference between [?the SDS] and the main wing of the HDZ [Croat Democratic Union] because only ideas conjured up in Zagreb rule on the territory controlled by the HVO [Croat Defense Council].

All of these incredible instances of long and persistent interference in the affairs of another state by Belgrade and Zagreb are being made under the pretext of concern for the national interests of Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sincere concern and help for compatriots, which could provide opportunities for cooperation, is one thing, but a pretext for Belgrade-Pale and Zagreb-Grude alliances to achieve state and romantic-nationalist goals set in the last century is a completely different thing.

At this key moment for peace, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats should calculate the results of four years of concern for them and their protection by the neighboring states. They should count their gains and losses.

Mirko Pejanovic, a member of the presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and chairman of the Serb Civic Council [Srpsko gradjansko vece—body for a multiethnic Bosnia], said in a recent TV interview that over half a million Bosnian Serbs had left Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At about the same time, Fra Luka Marketic, a respected provincial of Bosna Srebrena [central Bosnia], [words indistinct] said that out of 800,000 Croats who lived on their farms in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the aggression, only 300,000 remained, and that is without mentioning 1.2 million Bosniaks.

What kind of results are these? Are these the results of concern of the neighboring politicians, policies, and states of their compatriots in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

And finally, it is important to know that Bosnia-Herzegovina is internationally recognized as a multiethnic community and that observers are not stationed on the state borders and that more attention is being paid to the borders between the two entities [in Bosnia].

On the basis of this, like the figure of about 2.5 million displaced people and refugees, we can come to some very negative conclusions. And the question of real peace, democracy, and return [of refugees] will depend on whether the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats will be aware of these findings and conclusions and whether they will start to make their own decisions about their own fate on the basis of these findings and conclusions in the way envisaged by the Dayton peace agreement. [end recording]

B-H: Bosniak Accused of War Crimes Asks Tribunal for Bail

AU2307124796 Paris AFP in English
1239 GMT 23 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Hague, July 23 (AFP)—Zejnil Delalic, a Bosnian Moslem accused of war crimes by the international criminal tribunal in The Hague, appeared before the judges Tuesday to ask for bail.

The judges who heard the plea said they would announce their decision later in the day after a further hearing which would take place behind closed doors. The exact time was not given.

Delalic, 48, has been held since May 8 in the UN prison in nearby Scheveningue after being arrested on March 18 in Munich by the German police.

He is accused of allowing his subordinates to murder at least 14 prisoners and carry out seven acts of torture, including two rapes, in the camp of Celebici in central Bosnia.

Delalic's lawyers, Edina Residovic and Ekrem Galijatovic, said that under the Austro-Hungarian legal code, only people suspected of crimes for which the death penalty was applicable could be detained.

The prosecution, represented by Theresa McHenry, said that the charges against Delalic were too serious to allow him bail. She said that the risk was also too high for the witnesses in the case. She pointed out that they lived in Bosnia, where Delalic was likely to go if released.

B-H: Security Situation 'Satisfactory' in Sarajevo Region

LD2307222196 Sarajevo BH PRESS
in Serbo-Croatian 1738 GMT 23 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 23 Jul (BH Press)—The security situation as a whole in the Sarajevo Canton since the reintegration is satisfactory. The work of the public security stations locally and their cooperation with the municipal authorities is quite good, although better cooperation should be established with the international police force (IPTF) in order

to avoid the public being misinformed and incorrect information being circulated about the security situation in the area of the canton, particularly its reintegrated parts.

This was the view expressed at a meeting today between Sabira Hadzovic, the president of the Sarajevo Canton, Ismet Dahic, the head of the Sarajevo central security service, and the heads of all nine municipalities that make up the Sarajevo Canton, and heads of the public security stations in these municipalities.

It was agreed that in the period from 5 February to 22 July the majority of criminal acts reported in the reintegrated city municipalities related to crimes against property, mainly damage to and theft of building materials left in abandoned residential buildings.

Dahic stressed that in the said period in the territory of the canton, 1,495 criminal acts had been reported to the relevant public prosecutors, of which 427 or 28.56 percent were in the reintegrated municipalities. He added that following an increase in the number of criminal acts in May 1996, in June, and the first 22 days of July there had been a noticeable drop in the number of reported crimes of 35 percent. In a breakdown of reported crimes, the most numerous were criminal acts against property making up 89.46 percent, criminal acts against the general security of people and property making up 5.38 percent, and crimes against the person 1.47 percent.

Since the reason for organizing the meeting were complaints from IFOR that the personal safety and security of property of citizens in the reintegrated municipalities were not satisfactory, security service head Dahic stressed that misinformation about the situation in the reintegrated municipalities was not achieving its goal and that individual cases were being reported to the IPTF, which did not have the authority to prosecute the perpetrators. He stressed that only the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation police were authorized to take legal measures against the perpetrators of criminal acts and violations of the law, and that it was essential that these cases should be reported to the relevant public security station. [passage omitted]

B-H: Comment: SDA Could Win 12 Municipalities in Serb Entity

AU1707124196 Novi Sad DNEVNIK
in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jul 96 p 5

[Commentary by Stevan Risovic: "Muslim Municipalities in the Serb Republic"!?]

[FBIS Translated Text] Party fervor and the struggle for power could, unfortunately, cost the Serb Republic nine

to 12 of its municipalities. In the Serb Republic there are already nine registered parties from the Muslim-Croat federation [Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina] that have proposed their own candidates for the three-member presidency of the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina and even a candidate for president of the Serb Republic, while the remaining six candidates are from the Serb Republic. The SDA [Party of Democratic Action] has chosen Abid Cozic from Srebrenica as its candidate for president of the Serb Republic. And that is not all. Lists of delegates for the Serb Republic assembly have been submitted by three parties from the Muslim-Croat federation. The SDA has proposed Smail Ibrahimovic, the SDP [Social Democratic Party] Temik Dedic. The position of vice president of the Serb Republic is the only one that is "ethnically clean," because among the seven proposed candidates, there is not a single Muslim or Croat. This is the situation as far as top state functions in the Serb Republic are concerned, which, as we can see, are very "tempting" to both the Croats and Muslims. At 3:00 p.m. on Monday the deadline expired for announcing lists of candidates for the municipal and canton elections. In the regional OSCE center in Banja Luka, they did not want to say a word about the names of parties and coalition blocs that had submitted lists for municipal delegates in the Serb Republic. But the news leaked out, and was confirmed this morning by Muslim Radio Sarajevo, that the SDA will be submitting to the Interim Elections Committee lists for all the municipal assemblies in the Serb Republic, while the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union], according to our information, will be interested in the "division of power" only in Banja Luka. At first glance, this is nothing unusual, because the voters will be the ones to decide which party they will vote for, and indeed, it is hardly likely that the Serbs will give a single vote to candidates of the SDA, but if the Muslims do vote for the SDA, that is something that could be a serious threat to the statehood and territorial integrity of the Serb Republic. The logic is simple: The Muslims were far more numerous in Visegrad, Vlasenica, Brcko, Zvornik, Srebrenica Bratunac, Srbinje ([Serb name for]Foca), Rogatica, etc. in 1991, at the time of the census, which is now being used as the basis for forming current lists of candidates and there was a "50:50" situation in Doboj, Prijedor, Novi Grad [Serb name for Bosanski Novi], Dubica [Bosanska Dubica], Sanski Most, etc. According to the 1991 census, in Brcko, for example, there were 38,788 Muslims and 18,113 Serbs. Even the Croats outnumbered the Serbs with 22,163. On the assumption that all the Muslims will vote for the SDA, and that their Croatian allies will join them, the Muslims would win an absolute victory in the September elections. Brcko would have

a "new face," because the mayor would be a Muslim, the municipal administrator would be a Muslim, and all other major functions would be "covered" by SDA people. It is possible, to a certain extent, that the refugees could frustrate the plans of the Muslims, whose intention, obviously, is to win the elections in 9 to 12 municipalities of the Serb Republic and in that way "occupy" these parts of the Serb Republic. According to information from the ministry for refugees and exiles, in Brcko there are currently around 27,450 refugees. The refugees are a relatively strong playing card, but it still may not be decisive in favor of the Serbs. The Serbs will "split" among themselves in support of several political parties, including the SDS, the Alliance For Peace and Progress, and the Democratic Patriotic Bloc, while the Muslims will probably all vote for the SDA. Of course, we need to wait until the elections are over, but then it may be too late, because the SDA will win in most of these municipalities. Who will then prevent the return of the Muslim population to all of these places? Who will prevent the SDA from appointing its own people to all the significant posts in those towns? Whether we like it or not, the results of the 14 September elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina will have to be verified by both entities, both the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation.

B-H: Bosnian Women's Party Founded

96BA0351B Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian
22 May 96 p 6

[Article by Nedžad Latic: "The Bosnian Benazir Bhutto Starts Off"]??

[FBIS Translated Text] What can Henri Levy do? In his book "The Lily and the Ashes," he praised Amila Omersoftic, the director of Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio-Television [RTV] as a potential Bosnian Benazir Bhutto. A few days ago Omersoftic took the steps prophesied by Levy's compliment. If those prophecies were fulfilled, the "Bosnian Benazir" would not exactly have an interesting political biography. She started in a little office belonging to the unknown firm OAD Trading, located on the street that leads up to the best-known bridge on Miljacka. From that office Omersoftic managed to guide the technical preparations for the 1st SDA [Party of Democratic Action] Congress in November 1991, and thus entered politics through the front door. She has never gone back to her little office again.

Somewhat earlier she was known as the sister of her older brother Faruk Omersoftic, who was sentenced to 20 years in prison. It is believed that his trial was staged by the political big shots at that time in

Sarajevo who were organizing the Winter Olympics. Amila acted in politics like a man. She even appeared in places where exclusively men can appear, according to Islamic Bosnian tradition. She thus appeared at a Muslim monastery in Zivcici during a big traditional zikr [invocation of God's name]. She belongs to a Dervish order, which is not a common tradition for Bosnian women. This is an almost unknown side of Amila's personality which, perhaps, best portrays her as a unique Muslim feminist.

Without One Finger

Since she appeared as the "authorized spokesman" on behalf of the "Women of Bosnia-Herzegovina" party, she has taken a new step toward Levy's prophecy. Representing herself only as the authorized spokesman is a temporary post, with the significance of a leadership position. Whether the relationship between Omersoftic and her party will develop that way depends on who is senior, Amila or the party. According to a lead article in LILJAN two months ago devoted to domestic one-party and multiparty coalitions, and according to an even earlier article on Omersoftic's conflict with then Prime Minister Silajdzic, the idea of founding her own women's party had already been born in Amila's head. This was confided to our editor by a woman whom Amila recruited. It was thus not the women who approached Amila, but the other way around. All the dilemmas regarding the position of the leader of Bosnian women thus disappear—it is Amila Omersoftic.

Why she has not been proclaimed before now is presumably because there has been no coordination among the "Women of Bosnia-Herzegovina" for the past year and a half. Since she has the initiative, and the campaign term is expendable, she (hastily) also left the position of spokesman. That haste led her to fly into a pure political "offside error" in Mostar. First and masculine!

Omersoftic has expressed her ambitions for the struggle in parliament with a result of two deputies' seats. That is modest for a person for whom Levy predicted the political career of the Pakistani prime minister, but also for a politician who was reputed within the ruling party (the SDA) to be "one of five fingers." Omersoftic held five party posts: member of the executive committee, chairman of the personnel commission, chairman of the culturological commission (her term), chairman of the main committee, and director of TV, because the SDA nominated her as a candidate for that position. She did not manage to keep all her posts, and in February 1996 she fell to the lower branches. Omersoftic explains her fall within the SDA in terms of "the end of the SDA's

need for me," and at the same time that is her reason for leaving the SDA.

Omersoftic, along with Silajdzic, is the second high SDA official to leave the party and found a new one. SDA spokesman Ismet Grbo explains all of this as a "tempest in a teapot." He expressed his surprise at the emergence of a "gender-based" party, which he claimed was a political rarity in the world. Along with the announcement by Mirsad Ceman that the SDA deputies' caucus would discuss whether Omersoftic would remain in the position of Bosnia-Herzegovina RTV director, this is a definite answer that even in the case of the founding of the "Women of Bosnia-Herzegovina" party the SDA will not wink an eye, and the same manipulations were engaged in at the very beginning as with Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina (SBiH). It was also explicitly denied by Edhem Bicakcic, who claimed that the SDA did not want to use Amila to buy women's votes.

Fighters and Opponents

The speculations about a struggle for women's votes is once again linking Amila and Haris, whose political careers are interwoven on several counts. Those who assume that the SDA winked an eye at Amila's action are proceeding from the assumption that women's votes are Silajdzic's biggest potential.

Amila and Haris actually met in politics when he formed a government for the first time. Then Silajdzic removed Amila from his team, where she headed the Directorate for Refugees. Amila waited for an opportunity and tried to retaliate with an attack against him from the position of RTV director. When Silajdzic submitted his first resignation from the post of prime minister, the SDA main committee urgently met in Zenica. The meeting was chaired by Omersoftic. That was a rare opportunity for her to triumph.

Silajdzic's definitive departure from the SDA also coincided with Amila's fall to the lower branches, perhaps precisely because of too much gloating in Zenica. It is most likely that her party colleagues punished her in that way because she was perceived as a person who had had the main say for a long time in "household quarrels."

Her temperament and great passion in politics were viewed by cynics as the rule of "feminocracy" in the SDA. They thus identified her politically as the brain of the five-member clique that consisted, along with her, of Bicakcic, Bukvic, Alispahic, and Kreso. Her undisputed political domination during the period from 1993 to 1996 was very difficult to understand. Many people wondered where she got such political power.

By the same standard and logic by which Silajdzic was viewed as Izetbegovic's favorite, the same term was also attributed to her. In the SDA political context, that was and remained her biggest political capital. Their departure today is rehabilitating President Izetbegovic in this regard: liking fighters does not mean liking opponents and short-tempered people, as both Silajdzic and Omersoftic were often characterized. The SDA's experience with the two of them will be tied even more to the realization that both of them planned their flight long before their official departure. Are there more such people in the SDA? Probably. But what can be done with such people? The SDA adopted a proposal for special elections in many organizations, and that means a personnel purge.

Several political events governed this SDA action. The first was the break with Silajdzic, who gathered up all the SDA waverers and rebels. That was because he did not feel like assembling new personnel.

Bicakcic Is Left With Amila's Dowry

Silajdzic, perhaps precisely because of such people, is facing a political debacle. His charisma acquired in the SDA is being wasted by the capricious sowers of buttons, pencils, pens, and lighters at cafe tables. That is as far as his campaign propaganda goes. At the same time, those whom he has managed to win over, at least on paper, are apologizing at every step with the words "I didn't know, "No one asked me." That is the result of playing the card that allegedly Silajdzic is doing everything with Izetbegovic's blessing. Amila was always more principled, and immediately refused to play that same card.

If DNEVNI AVAZ has proclaimed Amila Omersoftic to be its personality of the week, the next will surely be Hamdija Kulovic, one of Silajdzic's eight vice presidents. According to information from sources close to the leadership of the Zenica-Doboj Canton SDA, Kulovic is returning to the United States. This possibility seems convincing after the statement by Muharem Cero that Kulovic would be prime minister if the SBiH won the elections. The fact that the statement was given without any external occasion reveals the crucial fact that a struggle for Kulovic is under way.

If the SDA wins the battle for Kulovic, Silajdzic will face a debacle. Spomenka Micic, another SBiH vice president, is involved in similar considerations (according to information from sources close to Beslagic). Silajdzic's personnel debacle is throwing the door wide open for the SDA to conduct an internal party purge. That is the only job that the SDA expects to perform during the election campaign in order to triumph on a large scale, according to its own expectations. The other

processes are taking place spontaneously, like the departure of Haris and Amila, which is (just one more) SDA contribution to political pluralism.

Amila left her great political dowry in the party to Edhem Bicakcic, and it will be interesting to see how Bicakcic gets rid of it, not just for the sake of the party itself but also for the sake of Bicakcic's position in it. Bicakcic enjoyed the confidence of President Izetbegovic, and she enjoyed his. Amila's court trials throughout Sarajevo with politicians and reporters are only part of that dowry. Omersoftic herself explains her (countless) lawsuits as her personal contribution to a law-governed state. Some people are inclined to view that as deliberately discrediting the SDA in cooperation with the opposition. To what extent the SDA interfered in the work of the Sarajevo courts and exerted pressure precisely because of Amila's private lawsuits will remain a question that the opposition will harp on during the election campaign. For the time being, there is an announcement by Salih Karavdic, a lawyer in the SDA's personnel commission, was authorized to represent the party in personnel policy for the Sarajevo courts. He is also leaving with her to join her (women's) party, more because of the unfinished lawsuits in the courts than because of that party's political goals. As far as politics is concerned, perhaps Amila's story could end here. As far as duels, lawsuits, and polemics on the political scene are concerned, however, Amila's story will not be over for a long time to come. DNEVNI AVAZ, a newspaper that favored her clique, described her as a woman made for the ring. She will have it, but it will not be just with Haris Silajdzic. It may be someone who is more of a challenge for her.

B-H: Patriotic Party Requests Postponement of Elections

AU2307162396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Patriotic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina has submitted a request to High Commissioner Carl Bildt, Robert Frowick, OSCE Provisional Electoral Commission head, and U.S. Envoy Richard Holbrooke to postpone elections until all conditions envisaged by the Dayton accord have been met. The request reads as follows:

We are writing to you to request that you do everything in your power to see that controversial regulations in the statute [pravilnik]—which are not in line with Dayton provisions—are annulled and to postpone the elections until such time that all conditions envisaged by the Dayton accord have been met. If the elections are held according to the current statute and before refugees and displaced persons have returned to their homes, they

will legalize ethnic partitioning and lend legitimacy to the authorities referred to as the Serb Republic (RS) in the Dayton accord. The RS has been the victim of ethnic cleansing and genocide. [sentence as heard] Holding elections under the present conditions would ultimately result in the destruction of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its 1000 years of existence.

The Patriotic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina will employ all legal and democratic means to see that the Dayton provisions are implemented, particularly the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes, because we believe this to be the surest guarantee for the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the survival of the 1000-year-old Bosnian state.

B-H: Plavsic Visits Brcko, Comments on Karadzic

*LD2307191196 Pale Srpska Televizija
in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 23 Jul 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Biljana Plavsic, acting president of the Bosnian Serb Republic, paid a working visit to Brcko today. Her objective was to gain personal insight into the current political situation in this town, the most topical issues being the upcoming elections and the accommodation of refugees.

[Begin Plavsic recording] I will directly address the man most responsible for the implementation of the elections, Mr. Frowick [head of the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina], to see whether there have been any changes over there in this respect; so far there has been no discussion of it. [sentence as heard] It has only been said that the only obstacle to the elections is that the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) has been denied the right to take part in the elections because it is led by Dr. Radovan Karadzic. [sentence as heard]

Dr. Karadzic—not just on this occasion but also ever since he came to power—has shown that he clearly understands the priorities—that his top priorities are the people and the state and only after that comes his presidency. This was very simple. Some say that there has been some turmoil—there has been no turmoil. Our policy was always drawn up in our institutions. The main guidelines of our policy were always laid down at assembly sessions. [passage omitted] [end recording]

B-H: Koljevic Reportedly Leaves SDS, To Found New Party

*AU2407133896 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ
in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jul 96 p 6*

[Article by Senad Mesetovic: "The Shakespeareologist Ran Off to Belgrade"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The vice president of the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nikola Koljevic, has left this function and has moved to Belgrade. Although this is still a confidential matter that the Pale officials are trying to conceal, DNEVNI AVAZ managed to find out this and other information on the separation between Koljevic and the leadership of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party].

The cooling of relations between Koljevic and the rest of the SDS did not happen overnight. There have been silent disagreements over the last six months, which recently resulted in Koljevic leaving the function of vice president. [passage omitted]

Exclusively Whiskey

Koljevic started drinking. In the beginning, this was not really noticeable, because the other heads of the Chetnik party were also drinking. But as time passed by, the Shakespeareologist increased his daily dosage of alcohol. [passage omitted]

Recently, even in his public appearances on Pale Television, it could be observed that he was dead drunk. According to claims made by persons close to him, his daily dose of whiskey was three to five bottles. [passage omitted]

Those informed about this issue claim that Nikola Koljevic is founding his own party in the Serb entity, which is to be a mild opposition to the SDS. His departure surprised even the SDS leadership, which has not yet oriented itself and has no explanation for the public as to the reasons of the former vice president's departure.

Discrediting Information

That this is a big matter and a great internal crisis for the party of criminals is also confirmed by the message that Koljevic has sent to his former colleagues. He promised to keep quiet and that he will not make any statements to the public, provided he is left in peace.

It is certain that Koljevic knows many secrets of the Pale leadership members and that he can provide the public with discrediting information about them. [passage omitted]

Time will tell as to whether the Pale leadership will leave him in peace, or whether Nikola Koljevic will reveal what he knows. One should expect that, when Koljevic's departure is announced, the SDS crisis will deepen, with the departure of others from the ranks of this party of criminals.

B-H: Serb Minister on Tightening Sarajevo-Pale Road Security

LD2307195396 *Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 23 Jul 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dragan Kijac, minister of internal affairs of the Serb Republic, has said that in the period ahead security on the road between Serb Sarajevo and Pale should be stepped up because there have been increasingly frequent cases of checks being made by the federation police.

In the future, Minister Kijac said, the Serb Republic will act on the basis of reciprocity in such cases. In other words, at each federation checkpoint, the Serb police will respond in kind [as heard].

Apart from this, concern about displaced persons is high on the list of priorities in Serb Sarajevo. [passage omitted]

B-H: Bomb at UN Police Station in DoboJ Causes 'Minor Damage'

AU2407090796 *Paris AFP in English 0848 GMT 24 Jul 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, July 24 (AFP)—A bomb has exploded outside a police station used by the United Nations in the Serb-held northern Bosnian town of DoboJ, a UN spokesman said here Wednesday.

Andrea Angelli, spokesman for the UN police force in northern Bosnia, said there were no casualties and only minor damage caused by the blast which he said occurred at around midnight (2200 GMT) Tuesday.

The spokesman said the police station which was the subject of the attack was on the outskirts of DoboJ.

He said the station was used and visited by UN police operating in the area, though they were not permanently based at the station. He could not say the reason for the attack.

UN police were investigating, he said.

The UN has nearly 2,000 police serving in Bosnia, operating out of police stations across the country to act as monitors of the local police forces. [passage omitted]

B-H: SDS Publishes Call to Serb Voters

AU2007211196 *Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1459 GMT 20 Jul 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] VESTI, a Frankfurt newspaper in Serbian, today carried an appeal issued by the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) in which citizens of the Serb Republic (RS) are called to participate in the elections on 14 September to decide themselves "about the destiny of their country— the RS," as well as to vote for candidates of that party who, it is stressed, are the "closest associates of Radovan Karadzic."

In the appeal published on the pages for paid advertisements, the SDS issues the appeal to all Serbs and "members of other peoples who decided themselves to link their destiny with the Serbs' destiny," to vote for this party's candidates for the posts in the RS and the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina—Biljana Plavsic, Momcilo Krajisnik, Aleksa Buha, Dragoljub Mirjanic, and Slobodan Bijelic.

"These are all the closest associates of Radovan Karadzic, a firm fighter for freedom and a democratic Serb state and whom our enemies hate most of all because he does not allow himself to be bribed and will not sell at any cost the RS which was achieved with trouble. He is a symbol of Serbian humanity and courage, and many people justifiably liken him to the greatest personages in our history," it is pointed out in the SDS advertisement.

B-H: SDS Official Comments on Karadzic Resignation

AU2007202196 *Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1255 GMT 20 Jul 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Jul (BETA)—Slobodan Bijelic, vice president of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and head of the party's list for parliamentary elections in the Serb Republic (RS), said that with his resignation, Radovan Karadzic again showed that the RS is his only interest.

"Over the past five days, we were exposed to unprecedented pressures from the world, as well as from Serbia," Bijelic said for today's DNEVNI TELEGRAF. He added that Nikola Sainovic, deputy prime minister of the FRY, threatened that "the RS will disappear if we fail to listen to President Milosevic and Sainovic."

"Milosevic and Holbrooke are wrong if they believe that they had destroyed Karadzic. His charisma within the Serb people is even greater because Serbs identify themselves with their sacrifices," the SDS vice president said.

In his opinion, Holbrooke is preparing "a similar slap for all Serbs."

"All this is a great preparation for Slobodan Milosevic's trip to The Hague," Bijelic concluded.

B-H: DPB Leader: Parties Must Learn From Karadzic's Resignation

LD2007172196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1445 GMT 20 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 20 Jul (SRNA)—Banja Luka Mayor Predrag Radic, the chairman of the Democratic Patriotic Bloc [Demokratski Patriotski Blok—DPB] and a candidate in the presidential elections in the Serb Republic, expressed doubt in Banja Luka today that "Dr. Radovan Karadzic's forced resignation to state and political posts will bring an end to pressure on the Serb nation."

Radic told SRNA that "the Serb nation has been under pressure for too long" and added that "there can be only one victor in the upcoming elections—the Serb people of the Serb Republic."

"In this moment we must not succumb to any pressure from abroad and, in particular, to calls from the diaspora to boycott the upcoming elections, because that will be a defeat for the Serb nation and will lead to the dissolution of the Serb Republic," Radic said.

According to Radic, all political parties must learn a valuable lesson from President Karadzic's decision to resign and should present a clear standpoint on the future of the Serb Republic in the democratic election campaign.

B-H: Vucurevic Predicts 'Landslide' Victory for SDS

AU1907103496 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 11 Jul 96 p 5

[Interview with Bozidar Vucurevic, SDS mayor of Serb-occupied Trebinje in eastern Herzegovina, by Nevenka Galic; place and date not given: "We Will Win For Sure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We spoke with Bozidar Vucurevic, mayor of Trebinje, in his office, after his return from Pale, where he had been attending a meeting of the main committee of the SDS [Serb Democratic Party] which decided that president Karadzic's name would not be included on the list of presidential candidates at the coming elections. Before our interview began, Vucurevic told us a short anecdote about how power can be exercised from the shadows. He gave the following example: "Zoran Lilic is officially president of Yugoslavia,

but Slobodan Milosevic runs the country from the shadows."

Asked how he saw the latest events in the Serb Republic and the constant pressure of the international community on the Serbs, he said: A calamity for a nation is when it has to fight a war in its own country and a total catastrophe is when a nation strikes against itself. This has been a Serb characteristic in many wars in the past. This time we have managed to avoid a mutual armed conflict by calling on people regardless of their ideology. Unfortunately, we could not avoid the first calamity. The international community is exerting pressure on our president, Dr. Radovan Karadzic to remove himself from public and political life and, most important of all, to resign as president. But what is worse, not only is the international community applying pressure, but Yugoslavia too is coercing us into making president Karadzic withdraw. That is why I said what I just said a moment ago, that the greatest tragedy is when a nation strikes against itself. One part of the Serb nation has begun pressing down us with all its force. Dayton has not been followed. Everyone else can obstruct the process, but the Serbs, whatever they do, are always guilty. Fearing that they might deceive us, regarding these coming elections, we did not even want to submit a list of candidates with president Karadzic's name, but we found a worthy substitute instead. The main committee of the SDS, of which I am a member, accepted this decision with a heavy heart. But we had to do it under compulsion. We hope that this is the first time, in fact, we are certain that it is unprecedented in the history of democratic elections. As you can see, they are not that democratic at all, but we had to give in. Now, where does the giving in stop? That remains to be seen. At the main committee of the SDS we set an absolute minimum, because the international community and, unfortunately, Yugoslavia too, can persist in their demands, but we have drawn the absolute bottom line and said that this is the last thing that we can yield to in the face of such oppression.

[Galic] The international community apparently does not mind Croatian and Muslim national parties, but it does mind the SDS and its chairman, Dr. Radovan Karadzic. Why is that?

[Vucurevic] First, we must say that it is not the person of Dr. Karadzic that bothers the international community, but the SDS, that is, the Serb nation. They are doing nothing to restrain the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] or the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ], yet they are going all out against the SDS and the Serb people, because the SDS is the Serb people. It is the Serb nation's beacon, it led the Serb people successfully prior to the outbreak of war, then it prepared its people

so as to prevent them from going through even greater destruction and a larger exodus. It guided its people through the war and it will certainly continue to guide the Serb nation through these post-war years. That is why they are pressuring president Karadzic so as to decapitate the SDS and, therefore, the Serb people as well.

[Galic] What can you tell us about the proposal made by Vojislav Seselj that the SDS enter a coalition with the Radicals?

[Vucurevic] My thanks to Mr. Seselj. When the counting is over, I hope we will concur with all the Serb patriotic parties. But we have no need to enter any kind of coalition. We expect to win at least 80 percent of the votes in the Serb Republic and we will not turn our backs to other kindred parties, as opposed to these non-Serb parties that want to destroy the Serb Republic.

[Galic] Are you referring to the socialists? They claim that their primary interest is the preservation of the Serb Republic.

[Vucurevic] They are not socialists. We must say what they really are. They are communists. It is the Communist Party of Yugoslavia that has crossed the Drina River to this side. As you can see, they are beginning to go back to calling each other comrade, they are returning to the spirit of AVNOJ [Anti-fascist Council of the Peoples Liberation of Yugoslavia, which determined the post World War II organization of socialist Yugoslavia], the spirit of Tito. Unfortunately for a long time we used to say, "After Tito, Tito." Well, as you can see, the Serbs got him. After Tito, they still have Tito. Therefore, they are not socialists, but communists, and they are prepared to disguise themselves with different costumes five times a day if they have to. Their interest is not the Serb Republic or the Serb national interest. The communists in Serbia and Montenegro are concerned about our programs, because we said that we would give the Serb people back everything that the communist regime took away from them by force. First of all is privatization, returning property to citizens, to the church, and in addition, after the elections are over, we will let the people decide what kind of state they want. Since the monarchy was taken away from the Serbs by force, we are not going to reinstate a king, the monarchy, but we will let the people have their say and the people will decide what they want, because even that right has been taken away from them. I do not think that there can be anything more democratic than that. Now the communists are concerned over privatization, because with privatization there is no communism. Returning property to the citizens is something that worries them very much and

now the fact that we are going to let our own people decide whether they want a monarchy is adding fuel to the fire. The communists want a state that would undermine all the results of this war, all the blessed victims who lost their lives, all that our people have for centuries wanted. I think that this is the last chance. If the Serbs go wrong this time, if they do not achieve their own national state, there will be no more opportunities and they will be very disappointed and will never recover from such a blow. I think that our people know this and they will vote for their SDS, because that is the only way to preserve the Serb national state called the Serb Republic.

[Galic] How do you comment on the elections in Mostar and the fact that the Serbs came out to vote at the elections?

[Vucurevic] That is ridiculous. Two things became apparent there, actually three very important things. How the international community is gloating sanctimoniously about how well things turned out in Mostar, but it was an obvious indication that there can be no life together. It has shown that the Croats and Muslims are splitting. It has shown that the Croats, unlike the Serbs, are more unified, regardless of political parties. You see, 99 percent of them voted for the Croatian cause. Will we be able to do that? I hope that the Serbs will realize this. Mostar has shown that there is no togetherness. It has shown that this is a divided country, but it has also revealed repeated Serb blindness for having voted in Mostar. Every person with a semblance of a brain should have realized that he can only expect to be beaten and abused and that there can be no place for Serbs in Mostar, but it has also shown that we must fight for a national state and nothing else.

[Galic] Recently there have been repeated attempts by IFOR [Implementation Force] soldiers to arrest some of our people. Do you think that they will dare arrest our leaders, too?

[Vucurevic] IFOR came here to keep the peace. At least that is the pretense that it came under. However, IFOR keeps overstepping its authority and is going a step further than that. They came quietly, but they are continuously arming themselves and keep coming up with new demands. They are behaving impudently. That is a form of silent occupation, as I had expected. However, we would not be a nation if we allowed them to arrest Karadzic and Mladic. In that case we would all have to rise up. I heard recently of an attempted kidnapping in Srinje [Serb name for Foca] of our generals, who were totally innocent. The people prevented it. We must pay a lot attention to these things, we must tell our people that in any similar case of

kidnapping, arresting, snatching, they must all rise up against it. The events in Srbinje are a recent example. And as I said, their demands know no bounds. One can never tell what the devil is thinking about. Our people have a saying, "It is better to have an empty bag than a devil in the bag." But since we have a devil in our bag, we will have to be careful how he behaves in our country. We will have to call on our people to protect their leaders. Because if they allowed this, then we would not deserve to have a state.

[Galic] Are we capable and do we have enough strength to resist them?

[Vucurevic] Absolutely. The Serb nation has resisted many things. It endured against all of Croatia and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they waged war together. It endured not only the Muslims, but a large part of the Muslim world, as well as pressures of the international community. As you can see, they are testing their strength here and our durability. But we will not submit, just as we have not submitted so far.

[Galic] Recently there have been provocations on account of Herzegovina and Herzegovinians, such as rumors that Herzegovina will be attached to Montenegro and that Herzegovinians are actually Montenegrins.

[Vucurevic] Montenegro is three times larger as it once was and Herzegovina is three times smaller than it once was. Somebody was always taking something away from Herzegovina. Herzegovinians make up the largest part of Montenegro, so it cannot be true that Herzegovinians are Montenegrins. We should not waste words on that. They are trying to divide the Serb Republic in every possible way and one of those ways is the theory that Herzegovina will become part of Montenegro. Herzegovina will go with the Serb Republic, because it is part of the Serb Republic and nothing else, along with our aspiration to have a joint Serb state with all the other Serb lands. I am primarily referring to Serbia and Montenegro. But Herzegovina will not go anywhere except into the Serb Republic, because it is its integral part.

[Galic] How do you forecast the coming elections? Does the SDS have any serious rival?

[Vucurevic] The SDS won a landslide victory at the last elections. That was the eve of the war, in 1990. This is the end of the war, if the war has actually ended at all. These elections are more important than those in 1990. This is an integral part of the war. The finale of the war. Why do I say that? Because the elections are being held under pressure, under occupation, under constant threats, and because the results of the war are being summed up now. I think that all the Serbs are cognizant

of that gravity, they know that SDS is the only way to preserve their national state, prevent their downfall, not have to light candles secretly at night over the graves of their sons, not be proclaimed some kind of renegade Chetniks and lose all that they gained through a four-year struggle. And not only a four-year struggle, but a centuries old struggle. I am convinced that the Serbs know that only the SDS is a capable and serious party, which will know how to bear the burden on its back, and I am convinced that we will win at least 82 percent of the vote in the Serb Republic.

[Galic] What do you think Bosnia-Herzegovina will look like after the elections? Do you really believe that it will finally be divided?

[Vucurevic] When our people have to finish a job, there is a traditional saying: "I just need to finish this, and peaceful Bosnia. I just need to marry off my daughter, and peaceful Bosnia. I just need to plow this field, and peaceful Bosnia." Why do they say that? Because Bosnia had always been troubled. Europe is the most interesting continent in the world. The Balkans are the most interesting region on the old continent, and in the Balkans, the most interesting area is Bosnia-Herzegovina. And that is why people say that the Balkans are always restless, and the center of the Balkans is Bosnia. When will it be peaceful? With the separation of the three nations that really do not want to live together. The Croats do not want any kind of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they do not want any kind of Yugoslavia. They have allies and they have tacitly been given the green light. You can see how they do this. They are temporarily receiving these new "Turks" [derogatory Serb name for Bosniaks] into their cold embrace, but they will get rid of them when the time comes. You will see the forming of this Croatian national council in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina are becoming members of the Government of Croatia and they will unite. They accused us of creating a greater Serbia and what they actually created was a greater Croatia. Divisions are inevitable and there is nothing more to say; the only question is, what will become of the semination called the Muslims? The division will certainly be completed during the elections. Actually, after both elections, the ones in Bosnia-Herzegovina and those in the United States, because Clinton wants to keep Bosnia until the elections in America are over. In any case, these elections will bring the disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Galic] You were recently reelected chairman of the municipal committee of the SDS. Does that mean that you are no longer going to be the mayor?

[Vucurevic] I can say that we in Herzegovina are among the first founders of the SDS, because we had begun to work here much earlier than they began in Sarajevo and for a while we worked in parallel. We did not know about each other. On July 14, 1990, I organized the constituent assembly in Trebinje with the help of the late Jovan Raskovic. That is one of the oldest founding assemblies in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was very difficult to do. There was great pressure. Sleepless nights. I was the first SDS chairman in Trebinje, the first chairman of the municipal committee, chairman of the regional committee for both Herzegovinas. We say eastern and old Herzegovina. Then later I became the mayor. Later they also asked me to be the chairman of the SAO [Serb Autonomous Region] of Herzegovina. Those were numerous functions that were really very difficult to carry out. That was the time when people shied away from responsibility. Everyone wanted something to happen, but they all wanted to stay away from it, which is only human and must not be held against them. Afterward, I began to let go of one function after another, because it was just too much. The Serb National Council had ceased working, the SAO of Herzegovina had ceased to exist. Later I was not even chairman of the municipal committee of the SDS in Trebinje. I was working here. This autumn it will be six years that I have been mayor. That is more than enough in these difficult times. I will change my occupation. I would not want to continue as mayor, except if the party ordered me to remain. That is why I agreed to be chairman of the municipal committee of the SDS. I was recently elected member of the main committee of the SDS, which I was earlier. I was also nominated as a delegate in the Serb Republic. There will again be many functions and a lot of work, but I am sure that we will carry it out successfully.

[Galic] Throughout history the Serbs have often had migrations. Do you think that this is perhaps the last Serb migration?

[Vucurevic] What has happened to us, this mass migration, is both bad and good. At a meeting of the assembly I said that the Carnojevic migrations were not as big as we usually imagine. In the migrations under Ivan Carnojevic, anywhere from 78,000 to 80,000 Serbs left their homes. Now, more than 1 million Serbs were on the move, which means 12 times more and I think, having in mind so many migrations, so much spilt blood, that we will finally learn our lesson, that we will finally create a strong and unified Serb Republic.

[Galic] Several parties from the Federation will be taking part in the elections in the Serb Republic, but the opposite will not be the case. Will the Serbs in the Federation be able to vote for the SDS for example?

[Vucurevic] They might, but there will be trouble. I am certain that the Serbs will not be allowed to express their views freely, as the Croats and Muslims will. You see, even Yugoslavia is not doing anything to ensure that our people there can vote freely. Yugoslavia is just observing everything in silence and promises nothing that would enable the Serb refugees in Yugoslavia to vote. Serbia and Montenegro are not interested in helping us, but I think that our people will try everything to exercise their human, constitutional, and national rights and that they will vote the best way they can.

[Box p 5]

Marriage

At the meeting of the Main Committee, president Karadzic asked me what the chances were of the communists and the other insignificant parties winning the elections in Trebinje. I told him that they had about as much chance as I had marrying Miss Europe. As my chances are zero there, so are their chances here, Vucurevic said.

B-H: Bijeljina SDS Leaders Meet To Discuss Election Campaign

AU2407112796 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 22 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The presidency of the Bijeljina Municipal Committee of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] held a meeting with presidents of local committees from the Bijeljina area today to discuss the current political situation and the election campaign. "As the ruling party, the SDS had many important activities and responsibilities and produced many results in the previous period. The position of the SDS has never been more difficult. We are faced with the fact that the international community is exerting pressure on the SDS to prevent it from reaching its goal," said Cvijetin Mikic, president of the SDS Municipal Committee. He appealed to presidents of local committees to make another effort not to yield to pressure and to keep the votes of people who trusted them in 1990. The presidents of local committees have absolute faith in the SDS municipal leadership and underline that the current problems must be solved as soon as possible in order to be prepared for the September elections. One of the proposals that is to be realized in the next couple of days is to constitute election headquarters in local committees. "Peace and the Serb Republic," was the conclusion of today's meeting of the Bijeljina SDS municipal leadership and members of local committees of the area.

B-H: OSCE Asks Internet Users for Help in Reaching Refugees

*LD1907151296 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1418 GMT 19 Jul 96*

[“Pool” item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, July 19 (TANJUG)—The Bosnia mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on Friday [19 July] asked the Internet users who know Bosnian refugees in their neighbourhood to contact them and help them register for voting in absentia.

The statement said that about 900,000 Bosnian refugees, who live in 35 countries, would be able to receive ballots through the OSCE's electronic address: <http://www-osce.austria.eu.net>.

Under the Dayton Peace Agreement, the OSCE Bosnia mission is in charge of preparing and monitoring Bosnia's first post-war elections on September 14.

B-H: NEZAVISNE NOVINE Plans To Publish Daily Edition

*AU2307131596 Banja Luka NEZAVISNE NOVINE
in Serbo-Croatian 17-23 Jul 96 p 27*

[Statement by “the editorial board”: “NEZAVISNE NOVINE Daily Soon”]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the goal of creating a democratic environment prior to the 14 September elections, we decided to start the preparations for the printing of the daily edition of NEZAVISNE NOVINE. Aware that this is a time of stormy political turbulence marked by the common goal and desire of the Serbian people and all citizens of the Serb Republic to create a democratic society, we believe that, by issuing an objective daily, we will also make our contribution to the realization of this goal. Naturally, just as so far, the present magazine edition will arrive to your paper shops each Wednesday.

Croatia: Granic Discusses Allegations, HDZ Relations

AU2407071696 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA
in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jul 96 pp 6-7

[Interview with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic by Olga Ramljak; place and date not given: "Radical Measures for the Restoration of the Reputation of HDZ in Dubrovnik!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Until yesterday Foreign Minister Mate Granic was the minister who enjoyed the best relations with journalists. He was one of those rare strong figures on the Croatian political stage without a faction, privatization, or scandal associated with his name. Overnight, however, the media attacked Minister Granic with sensationalistic headlines about his purchase of a huge apartment, his participation in the scandal of an internal party settlement in Dubrovnik, his conflict with Minister of Defense [Gojko] Susak, and questionable personnel practices at the large and expensive Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The worst story is the one about Granic's extradition of "Croats to the Hague Tribunal to get a ticket to enter the Council of Europe."

[Ramljak] Those accusations about the apartment, Susak, The Hague, personnel have proved false, and the party is expected to produce a verdict regarding the Dubrovnik scandal. From where does this avalanche of scandals associated with you come?

[Granic] That is the campaign of only one paper: NACIONAL. Analyses show that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can be satisfied with its position in the public. There are no complaints, neither from HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], nor from the opposition. The Law on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been unanimously adopted at the National Assembly.

And regarding the accusations about the ministry's being large and expensive, you must understand that the ministry has 600 employees; it accounts for 0.85 percent of the state budget, and we have only been developing our diplomatic network, which is usually expensive. For comparison, foreign ministries in countries approximately the size of ours, like Denmark, Austria, Slovakia, spend from 0.8 to 1.2 percent of the state budget, they have at least twice the personnel, and their diaspora is not even remotely as big as ours—and we have to serve the diaspora, as well as other citizens who live abroad. I think we have a nice sense for the people, and as I have done so far, I personally advocate full freedom of the media, which is one of the foundations of the democratic organization of any country. Let me conclude by saying that if both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

I are under attack by only one, then that is a sign that we are on the right track.

The Dubrovnik Scandal

[Ramljak] What do you know about the scandal related to the "eavesdropping" in Dubrovnik? Is it a division within HDZ—that is, what will be the consequences for the participants of this scandal? What do you think about eavesdropping?

[Granic] I am the representative of Dubrovnik, and the vice president of HDZ, and in that capacity I participated in the elections of the HDZ Municipal Board. I most severely condemn all divisions in HDZ between domestic Croats and Herzegovinians, and particularly the practice of eavesdropping. We will have a very clear stand about it. We will discuss it at the HDZ Presidency, and the people who have participated in this shameful plot will not be able to remain in any party offices. My role in all this is only that I am one of those who has been informed about what had happened. The Presidency of HDZ will answer that very soon, as early as this week.

[Ramljak] When you say that they who have participated will not be able to remain in any party offices, are you referring to those who eavesdropped?

[Granic] Of course, I refer to those who have committed this dishonorable act of eavesdropping and recording. At the same time, I am also referring to those who have acted in any dishonorable way possible; that is, to those who have contributed to the divisions and factions in the party. The Presidency of the party will decide about that.

After my second visit to Dubrovnik accompanied by the HDZ secretary, Mr. Valent, I am even more convinced that we need more radical measures in order to restore the reputation of the party in Dubrovnik as well as the total reputation of HDZ authorities in the town.

[Ramljak] The Dubrovnik scandal leads us to the often-mentioned subject of division within HDZ. What are internal party relations like in HDZ?

[Granic] I would like to say that HDZ is, primarily, a big party. According to the results of the elections for the House of Representatives of the Croatian National Assembly, HDZ belongs to a small number of parties in Europe which together can claim an absolute majority in the parliament. Furthermore, it is natural that in every party there are factions and there are people who contribute with their behavior to define those factions as differences. There is nothing wrong with that because dialogue within a party must remain open, but the decisions of the party must always be carried out.

Second, the central policy of HDZ provides for reconciliation of all those differences. For instance, party elections have been held in several towns, based on a clear, pro-European orientation and maintenance of specific regional features. The central policy also advocates dialogue with centrist parties and others in order, for example, to overcome the Zagreb crisis [election of the mayor]. We have just resumed negotiations after talks with HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] were interrupted. Our cooperation with the International Tribunal in The Hague also follows along those lines. Croatia's foreign policy has a special accent toward the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the relation of Croatia toward the European regional approach to the solution for the states-successors to former Yugoslavia and toward political pressures of all big states. The policy "the worse—the better" and the resistance of any dialogue with HDZ directly harms the state.

Paraga Refused Help

[Ramljak] It is a fact that among ourselves there are those who suffer from a Europe syndrome, meaning that they do not care about Croatian admission into European integrations. To what extent does HDZ suffer from that syndrome?

[Granic] I would not say that they are enemies of Europe and Croatian membership in its associations. It is simply an emotional reaction of some people toward the pressures on Croatia regarding that. It has nothing to do with HDZ, whose stand toward Europe is well known.

[Ramljak] Does that mean that you are not in disagreement with Minister of Defense Gojko Susak, as some of the media have reported over the last couple of days?

[Granic] There is no Susak-Granic conflict nor there has ever been one. We have confirmed that by our personal statements, by the activities of the ministries which we head, and by being members of the government, whose policy we carry out. If you refer to the awkward statements regarding the cooperation of Croatia with the Hague Tribunal given by the team of solicitors defending the accused Croats—they were unnecessary and have been explained.

[Ramljak] You have not only been attacked by NACIONAL but also by Dobroslov Paraga, president of HSP [Croatian Party of Rights]. He claims that he will bring charges against you because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not help him when he was arrested in Canada. He says that the ministry had, in fact, been trying to keep him from entering that country.

[Granic] Mr. Paraga has forgotten to mention that he was traveling to Canada with a Slovenian passport—

not a Croatian passport—with a visa which he had not applied for as a Croatian citizen. He has also forgot to inform journalists that he neither asked the Croatian Consulate for help nor had he informed them that he had been taken into custody.

Despite that, immediately after we found out that he had been taken into custody, the Croatian General Consulate in Canada offered its assistance. Mr. Paraga refused that assistance. I must point out that his accusations that the Croatian Embassy in Ottawa is responsible for the charges or procedures of the Canadian authorities against him, absolutely do not stand, nor his accusations that the present government had anything to do with it. The embassy offered its help to Mr. Paraga without conditions, and Canadian officials can attest to that.

[Ramljak] Did the Granics buy a new apartment?

[Granic] Objectively speaking, my family of six needs a larger apartment than the one we have now. When we buy a new apartment or a house, I will inform the public about it because I will be proud that I was able—alone, without any assistance from the state, or any loan from state banks—to solve my own housing problem. That is how I handle things, and everything else is a lie. I want to point out that the editors of NACIONAL have information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that shows I have not taken any loan, that I was not building a house, that I have given a written statement about it, and that before putting out this false information, they had known the name of the real purchaser of that very house.

Impatient Refugees

[Granic] In the last issue of NACIONAL the editors are trying to "make up" by saying that they have made a big mistake. Being completely supportive of the freedom of the press, I have handed the whole case over to the Croatian Journalists' Society Court of Honor. Perhaps we will one day hear who is standing behind all those NACIONAL lies.

[Ramljak] What are the priorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the decision to admit Croatia into the Council of Europe?

[Granic] The creation of international preconditions for the implementation of peaceful reintegration of Croatian Podunavlje [Danube River basin], normalization of relations with Belgrade, strengthening of the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, promotion of relations with our neighbors, and joining European and Atlantic integrations; there are also relations with the United States, development of economic relations of Croatia with the countries in Europe and others.

[Ramljak] The refugees are satisfied neither with the development of peaceful reintegration nor with what is finally offered to the returnees.

[Granic] To return without a war, without new casualties, is a great step in and of itself. The ultimate goal is for returnees to come back to find Croatian police on the Croatian border; everything else is just a question of dates and mechanisms of introduction of Croatian authorities into that region. In the international community, no one talks any more about Serb autonomy. I understand the impatience and criticism of the displaced who have been waiting to return for the past five years. However, it is important to create legal and secure conditions, and material and economic preconditions for a dignified return of all those who have had to leave their homes in the face of the Serbian aggression. Those conditions will prevail, too, because the process of peaceful reintegration has been proceeding with less problems than anybody expected.

[Ramljak] Are you as optimistic regarding the Croatia's obligations toward the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina and strengthening of the Federation? What about criticism coming from the Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina that the Republic of Croatia has not been doing enough for them?

[Granic] Croatia has constantly been playing a constructive role in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, and it will continue to do so. Not all the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina are in the same position regarding the return. Croatia's official stand is that the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will not start functioning as long as the returnees' issue is not settled. Further, no charge yet has been made regarding the crimes committed against the Croats, although evidence has been forwarded to The Hague for crimes in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. So, it is not that The Hague has no evidence, which, I might add, I discussed in every meeting with the representatives of the International Criminal Tribunal and am doing now in public. Also as clear and as public is Croatia's stand regarding the refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina—that all of them should return to their homes. For without the return of the Croats, there will be no return of the Muslims, and only with such a principled policy can one ensure that the ethnic structure of cantons does not change. With such a principled policy regarding the refugees' return and regarding cooperation with The Hague, Croatia strengthens its credibility and right to be critical there where criticism is argued.

[Box, p 6-7]

Negotiations With EU in the Autumn

[Ramljak] What news did chairmen of the European Union [EU] Irish Foreign Minister Dick Sprint and European Commissioner Hans van den Broek bring along? What did you talk about with them?

[Granic] Mr. Van den Broek announced that negotiations with Croatia on the agreement on trade and cooperation will start in the fall. The means from the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program will now start being used for the projects of peaceful reintegration in Croatian Podunavlje. In the name of Croatia, I have asked specifically for money for minesweeping from the international community. With both distinguished guests I talked about comprehensive relations of Croatia with the European Union. Mr. Sprint and Mr. Van den Broek are satisfied with the present program, particularly regarding the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the role of Croatia in it, including the process of peaceful reintegration of Croatian Podunavlje. They gave positive marks to my report on what Croatia is doing regarding the human rights condition in Croatia, in which I presented concrete data on the number of processed lawbreakers after Operation Storm, on the problem of Kupljensko [refugees from the Bihac region, followers of Fikret Abdic, Martić's and Karadžić's Muslim accomplice], on the return of the Serbs, on the situation regarding the election of the mayor of Zagreb, and on the creation of the Public Information Law.

[Ramljak] Are the announcements of new agreements conditioned by the regional global approach?

[Granic] We did not talk a lot about it. That is a sign that in Europe they respect our stand on differentiating cooperation from conditioning that cooperation, our firm stand that we will develop good relations with the other countries in the Balkans, but we do not want conditioning and institutionalization of that cooperation. Sprint and Van den Broek expressed their full understanding of our stand.

Croatia: Opposition Leaders View Possible Coalition

AU2207073996 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian
19 Jul 96 pp 2-4

[Article by Davor Butkovic: "President Franjo Tudjman Intends To Form a Government of National Unity With the Opposition Parties by the End of July!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hrvoje Sarinic, the president's main adviser, former prime minister, and the former

head of the intelligence service, told us several days ago: "I think that major political changes will take place in Croatia this month or in August at the latest, and the opposition will be able to participate in power at the national level."

Another topic that we discussed with Sarinic was the possible forming of a coalition government on the model of the government of national unity that was formed exactly five years ago. That government helped prevent some radical nationalists in the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] from removing Franjo Tudjman.

Academician Dalibor Brozovic, one of the founders of the party in power, was the first person who suggested—in the name of the HDZ—that a new coalition government be formed.

In Sarinic's opinion, the time is now ripe for a new cooperation of the HDZ and the opposition in the best interests of the country. Moreover, he thinks that the HDZ and the opposition are equally responsible for the Zagreb case [dispute over Zagreb city council], and that a great turning point in the relations between the two is about to happen.

"I would like you to quote this: The solution that the HDZ suggested for the Zagreb crisis is simply ridiculous. It is especially absurd for the HDZ to offer a coalition at the national level while they negotiate with the Zagreb opposition—who won the last elections—on the basis of a document that is a priori unacceptable!" SDP [Social Democratic Party] Chairman Ivica Racan told us two days after we spoke to Sarinic.

Racan confirmed that the Zagreb Alliance rejected the HDZ's suggestion for the solution to the Zagreb crisis announced by the HDZ representatives on Monday 15 July.

Two Levels of Negotiations

Other opposition leaders who we interviewed shared the opinion that the latest suggestion of the HDZ was nonsense because it did not offer a shadow of a compromise. The HDZ still insisted on having the post of the Zagreb mayor and almost 50 percent of the seats in the city council!

Stipe Mesic, HND [Croatian Independent Democrats] chairman, said: "The real intention of that suggestion is to give the HDZ some more time. The point is that, at the moment, negotiations are going on at two different levels. The HDZ leadership is trying to make a deal on a nationwide coalition first—that is, to form a coalition government—and then solve the Zagreb crisis."

The formation of a coalition government has become an important subject in Croatian internal politics in the last two weeks.

As the HDZ leadership failed to reach an agreement with any individual important opposition party, the leaders of the party in power decided that the only way for them to come to terms with the opposition was to form a wide national coalition.

Positive Reaction of the IDS

Various factions and influential politicians in the HDZ favor the idea of a big coalition out of various interests.

Foreign Minister Mate Granic is aware how much a solution like that would reinforce the international position of Croatia.

A coalition government would improve the political status of Zlatko Matesa, Hrvoje Sarinic, and Franjo Greguric because it would apparently weaken the conservative forces within the HDZ who dislike the managerial structure of the HDZ.

Zlatko Canjuga, Tudjman's commissioner for Zagreb, thinks that the formation of a coalition government would end the Zagreb crisis in a way that would be good for the HDZ.

On the other hand, none of the opposition parties—except for Cacic's HNS [Croatian National Party]—has rejected the suggestion to form another Government of Democratic Unity, as Greguric's 1991 cabinet was named.

Even the IDS [Istrian Democratic Congress], the HDZ's most radical opponent, reacted positively to the suggestion and added that representatives of all parliamentary parties—including the IDS—should enter the government.

"It is not true that I talked with President Tudjman," Ivica Racan insisted. "We refused to negotiate and asked that our contacts with the party in power be given official status. We are open to negotiations with any party. Croatia lacks tolerance anyway. However, we wanted the negotiations to be given a certain form or a name, for instance an 'exchange of opinions,' because that would not impose any obligations on us, and the public would know what those talks are really about."

The recent rumor about Racan is that he has had intensive talks with the HDZ and that he might be among Tudjman's most important partners in the possible coalition government.

The SDP chairman is also skeptical about the new government of national unity.

"First, we cannot consider that suggestion seriously, because we have not received it in a formal, written form. Moreover, the political platform of the new government must be far more intricate than the one drawn up in one night five years ago by a colleague and myself."

Stipulations of the Social Democrats

The SDP, as well as the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party], is insistent. The opposition parties will not agree to be a mere decoration in the new government or an international alibi for Tudjman and all the mistakes of his policy.

Their main stipulations are—thorough changes in the state politics, consistent adherence to the Dayton agreement ("Although I do not think highly of those agreements, I believe that Croatia must fulfill its international duties," Racan said,) and real democratization of the country.

Besides the changes mentioned, another thing that the social democrats will insist on—if the coalition government is formed—is the alteration of some political decisions, especially in the domain of economy and social policy.

The SDP obviously agrees with most requests that the HSLS made when it almost reached an agreement with the HDZ.

HSS [Croatian Peasants' Party] Chairman Zlatko Tomcic revealed an equally consistent political attitude, but in considerably more radical rhetoric.

As we can see, the three main opposition parties have faced Franjo Tudjman with strict and clearly defined stipulations for the formation of the national coalition that the president needs more and more every day.

Therefore, it is not unusual for President Tudjman to try—negotiating at the same time with smaller parties like the HND, or at least with his old friend Josip Manolic, the HND chairman—to disunite the opposition, which he has failed to do so far. Evidence of that is the united negative answer of the opposition to the latest HDZ's suggestion on the distribution of power in Zagreb.

Appointments Considered Already

Although the HDZ has not made an official proposition for the coalition government (that subject is discussed informally or in the media), the HDZ leadership is already considering appointments and the distribution of posts.

Hrvoje Sarinic told us: "There is no reason why Zlatko Matesa should not remain prime minister. He has been

doing his job very successfully. Besides, I do not think that the opposition leaders would mind if Matesa remained prime minister."

We commented that Matesa had problems even within the HDZ, and that influential politicians might use the reconstruction of the government to remove him. Sarinic answered in a relaxed manner that he had had problems with factions in the HDZ when he was prime minister, and Nikica Valentic and Franjo Greguric had similar problems. He said, however, that decisions on the central policy of the HDZ are taken by Franjo Tudjman, and he is supportive of Matesa.

On the other hand, a part of the opposition had a different opinion. An interviewee who wanted to remain anonymous said that the opposition was considering suggesting Mladen Vedris for prime minister.

We had no definite confirmation of that information. In any case, the former vice president of the government is on very friendly terms both with the HSLS and the HND.

However, Vedris's attitude toward the HDZ and President Tudjman has become quite radical lately, and the party in power is not likely to accept him in any combination of appointments.

Tudjman's Race Against Time

As time goes by, Tudjman's position in the negotiations with the opposition is deteriorating.

First, he does not dare schedule new elections, as is evident in the fact that he canceled the emergency assembly session in July. Laws on local elections—including Zagreb—were to be adopted at that session.

Tudjman and the HDZ do not want the elections because their popularity is decreasing week by week, as can be seen clearly in public opinion polls conducted by GLOBUS and other media, and no important economic or political success is at hand to change the trend.

Second, President Tudjman is facing enormous problems in his own party again because of the termination of Herzeg-Bosnia and the extradition of certain—formerly respectable—members of the HDZ to the International Tribunal in The Hague.

Therefore, he needs to reinforce his power—the sooner the better—by making an arrangement with the opposition. That would renew his popularity, because he would be able again to present himself as the president of all Croats, and not as a person who will not allow the implementation of the election results in the nation's capital.

We do not have to mention how good a coalition government would be for the international position of Croatia.

Finally, the coalition government would make Tudjman's victory in the next year's elections a sure thing, because his strongest rivals would spend one whole year on his side.

By staying in power for the next few years, Tudjman would protect the interests of the groups that actually rule the country, like the new capitalists who have made their fortunes with the support of the state.

Tudjman's possible defeat in the elections would endanger the status of a great part of Croatia's social, political, and economic elite. The present structure of Croatian society would dissolve almost as quickly as the communists' structure dissolved six years ago.

For all these reasons, the present political and social leadership wants Tudjman to stay in power. The president is a skillful politician and is aware that a coalition government is the best guarantee of stability for his rule.

When it comes to the opposition, the question is whether attitudes like those of Tomac or Budisa will prevail—that they should cooperate with the HDZ in the interest of the nation—or whether the opposition leaders will stipulate things that Tudjman will not be able to accept.

In any case, Hrvoje Sarinic, one of Tudjman's closest associates, was almost sure that "big political changes will take place before the end of this month."

[Box, p 2]

GLOBALUS's Public Opinion Poll

Would you support the government of national unity consisting of HDZ representatives and the main opposition parties?

yes—37.5 percent

no—36.5 percent

undecided—26.0 percent

Should the opposition let the HDZ have the post of the mayor of Zagreb in exchange for entering the government?

yes—27.5 percent

no—51.8 percent

undecided—20.7 percent

Do you think that the HDZ and the leading opposition parties will form a coalition government?

yes—31.5 percent

no—42.3 percent

undecided—26.2 percent.

Croatia: Serb 'Government' Discusses Erdut Implementation

AU2407072396 *Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 23 Jul 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [words indistinct] successful completion of the harvest were the two main decisions stated at today's session of the provincial government, held in Vukovar and chaired by Prime Minister Stanimirovic.

In the first part of the session, the implementation of the Erdut Agreement was discussed. UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] representatives, headed by head of the UNTAES civilian affairs, Mr. Gerard Fisher, attended this part of the session. Mr. Fisher gave the introductory speech on this item.

We are facing the time in which major decisions have to be made, said Fisher, adding that he had long discussions with Transitional Administrator Klein, who is in Vienna, on several key issues that are very important for the successful continuation of the UNTAES mandate. It is not Klein, but the UN Security Council that makes decisions on mandate extensions, said Fisher, and added that, on the basis of the demand made by the Serb side, Klein may easily propose that the mandate be extended, but he will do so only if he decides that some progress was being made.

Fisher presented a great deal of information regarding difficulties in financing the UNTAES mission and the administration in the province, as well as Mr. Klein's efforts to secure independent financing of the mission. However, this is not very easy since, according to the UN Security Council resolution, this should be a matter of agreement between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

All the three sides—UNTAES, the Croatian side, and the Serb side—agree that it is necessary to start the petroleum extraction at Djeletovci as soon as possible. According to what could be heard at the session, the proposals of the Serb and Croatian side have reached the point at which neither side will agree to a compromise. UNTAES has therefore left it for the two sides to reach an agreement by Saturday, and if this does not happen, Transitional Administrator Klein will make the decision on the future of the oil fields himself.

Discussing the [word indistinct] of opening offices for issuing documents, Gerard Fisher said it is necessary to create the conditions for every citizen who wishes to get

Croatian documents to do so, since, as he explained, in that way they will be able to exercise some personal rights, while, at the same time, the state will have more responsibility towards the citizens. Mr. Fisher announced that legal experts from Norway and the United States will be helping the citizens resolve any problems that may arise in exercising these rights.

Mr. Vojin Susa, secretary for justice and administration, said that it was agreed that three UNTAES administrative offices will be opened on the territory of the province early next month. The offices will be at the disposal of the citizens. It has not been decided yet where the offices will be, said Susa, adding that the Serb side had proposed that the offices should be in Beli Manastir, Vukovar, and Ilok, and in the offices of the transitional police forces [as heard]. The local administrative bodies that issue identification documents and other documents will continue to operate as usual, said Mr. Susa.

Borislav (?Jocic), secretary of the provincial secretariat for economy and energy, presented the information concerning the state of the negotiations on resolving the status of Nik [Krajina oil industry] and the oil fields in Djeletovci. He emphasized that the Serb side cannot go below its minimum demands, which the public is already familiar with.

Dr. Radislav Mutavdzic, secretary of the Provincial Secretariat for Information, said that, in view of the results achieved so far—without a single dinar invested, but with the cooperation of the Serb side—General Klein deserves a medal from the Security Council. However, he also asked a question: What did the Serbs get? Dr. Mutavdzic said that the Serbs had delivered the goods, referring to the successful demilitarization, the creation of the transitional police forces, the reestablishment of telecommunications, and other things, while in return they did not get an adequate amnesty law, no investment has been made in the economy and reconstruction, we have lost the most important source of money—the oil industry—and Mr. Klein was then told by Kostovic that the Croatian Government has not included this province in this year's budget plan.

In rounding up this item, the conclusion was that the Serb side has shown maximum cooperation in the peace process, and it was remarked that only those provisions of the agreement that suit the Croats have been implemented. Concern was therefore expressed about the future of the process unless the [word indistinct] of the implementation of the provisions of the Erdut Agreement that protect the rights of the Serb side are considered soon. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Serb Radio Criticizes 'One-Sided' UNTAES Policy

AU2407094896 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 23 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In one of his interviews, Mr. Klein [UN transitional administrator for Eastern Slavonia] said that the number one priority of UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] is the return of all refugees and displaced persons—both Serbs and Croats—to their homes. UNTAES thus organizes visits to the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem for Croats. The visits can be individual or group ones, and the UNTAES guarantees the safety of those who come. During the visits, those who waged war against each other during the past four years come into contact. In certain cases there are tensions and sometimes even incidents occur.

The latest example is yesterday's incident in Bilje. The people of Bilje prevented a group from entering the village of Luc from Croatia. The Croatian media and Croatian representatives have asked UNTAES to take repressive measures and the Serbs to get rid of the Serbs who do not suit the Croats.

It is worth noticing that initially incidents did not occur. UNTAES has set as its goals to reestablish the trust between the Serbs and Croats and to establish tolerance and mutual respect. How are they trying to achieve these goals?

Of the 30,000 Serbs expelled from Osijek, not one was offered the chance to visit their house—not to mention the Serbs expelled from the Krajina and other parts of Croatia. What are the feelings of a Serb from Osijek who lives in the house of a Croat from Lug, for example, when the owner, a Croat, comes for a visit, while he has no chance of visiting his property in Osijek? Is this the framework for creating tolerance and establishment of mutual respect?

The tone that the Croatian politicians use, particularly those from the Croatian Democratic Union, the party in power, is not changing either. Every chance they get, they, directly or indirectly, send the message to the Serbs that they have no place in the state of Croatia.

According to the reports of the Croatian Helsinki Committee, 25,000 Serb houses have been destroyed, and several thousand Serbs, mostly elderly people, have been murdered in the most atrocious ways. On the other hand, UNTAES asks the Serbs to accept the visit of Croats to the province without prejudice. Is this one-sided UNTAES therapy not a direct attack on the basic individual and collective human rights?

The Croats have organized visits to their churches. If constructive relations between the Serbs and Croats are reestablished, the constructiveness will begin with the establishment of the inviolability of places of worship. In order for the constructive process to begin, it is necessary to make it possible for Serbs to visit their places of worship and to be safe while they are there.

Since about a month ago the London media have been reporting on Orthodox icons being sold from Croatia. They are talking about several thousand icons, the average price being 5,000 pounds, according to THE TIMES.

The Croatian Government has not yet reacted to some of the highly cynical writings that say that this sale would fill the Croatian budget.

It takes the good will of both sides to reestablish the minimum trust, but UNTAES demands this effort only of the Serbs. This UNTAES tendency must be classified as unprincipled, and the undesired incidents as a logical consequence of lack of principle.

Croatia: Serb Group Says World Favors Croat Interests

AU2407063596 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 22 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Association of Serbs From the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Republic of Croatia has appealed to all the regional associations, homeland clubs, and committees of displaced persons to express solidarity with their compatriots in the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem who are, as their statement says, under pressure and threats of the Croatian authorities and are exposed to international community's injustice.

The Association supports all the just demands that the Serbs from the province presented in their recent petition to the UN secretary general, the Council of Europe, and UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] representatives.

It is high time for the responsible international forces to look the truth in the eye and realistically consider the position of the Serb people in the province, says the statement. In the Association's opinion, the discrimination of the international forces against the Serb people and their favoring the hypocritical, two-faced, and genocidal policy of the Croatian authorities have neither contributed to the resolving of the problems nor guaranteed peace.

The international community favoring Croatian interests has caused dissatisfaction and distrust among the Serb people—they distrust all the international community

forces, including the UNTAES, says the statement of the Association of Serbs From the Republic of Serb Krajina and the Republic of Croatia.

Croatia: Bosnian Refugees Urged To Register for Elections

AU2407065096 Beli Manastir Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 22 Jul 96

[Report by Nikola Grubisic]

[FBIS Translated Text] The citizens of the former Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will vote in the first post-war elections on 14 September. The registration of the voters and the verification of the names on the voters' registers from 1991 is supposed to be completed by 31 July. As a great number of refugees from the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina have been accommodated on the territory of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, the steering committee for the elections in the Serb Republic has taken certain measures aimed at registering all the refugees who have the right to vote and are living in this area. Here is part of the interview Nikola Grubisic conducted with members of the steering committee for elections in the Serb Republic.

[Unidentified official] The steering committee learned that many citizens of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina are not familiar with the rules for the September elections, and we took it upon ourselves to inform them that it is their obligation to be registered in the voters' registers or else they will not be able to exercise their voter's rights.

We have sent announcements and instructions to the communities in Vukovar Municipality as well as to the community offices in Beli Manastir Municipality. The citizens from the Baranja area, that is, from Beli Manastir Municipality, should report to the closest community offices or to the Secretariat for General Administration and Public Services, where they will receive specific instructions on what they are supposed to do.

We should emphasize that, in order to exercise their voters' rights, they must be registered in the voters' registers, and, as you said, the deadline for this is 31 July 1996.

[Grubisic] How are they going to get to the Serb Republic, that is, Bosnia-Herzegovina, to vote? It is common knowledge that there will be no polling stations in this area.

[Unidentified official] Bearing in mind that the funds of the refugees from the former Bosnia-Herzegovina

who live here are quite modest, as is the case with all refugees, the steering committee will try, in cooperation with the authorities of the Serb Republic, to organize transportation for all those who want to vote.

If the committee does not manage to do so, we will promptly inform [words indistinct], in which case (?they will probably have to arrange their own transportation).

[Grubisic] All the refugees from the former Bosnia-Herzegovina currently living in the province should

report to their communities by (?26) July at the latest. In order to register, they need to have some form of identification documents issued on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as the ID card, passport, driver's license, a military card, birth certificate, wedding certificate, certificate of citizenship, health insurance card, or proof of residence.

FYROM: Ethnic Albanians Demonstrate in Tetovo
AU2307125896 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian
 23 Jul 96 pp 1, 3

[Article by I. Arslani: "Imprisonment of Professors Shows the State's Weakness"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tetovo, 22 Jul—Dr. Fadil Sulejmani, rector of Tetovo University, and Milaim Fejziu, chairman of the University Senate, reported at midday yesterday to serve their prison sentences of one year and four months respectively that were issued by the Skopje District Appeal Court after a period of time they have spent out of custody, released on bail of tens of thousands of German marks. Protesting against the imprisonment of the university leaders, the Student Union organized a long column of more than 10,000 people with Albanian national flags and a banner inscribed "Fadil, Milaim, Nevzat, Musli, Arben—Freedom." The crowd set off from the campus, and, after proceeding down many streets and passing the building of the Interior Ministry Directorate in Tetovo, arrived at the gates of the prison to shouts of "University, university;" "We will not give up Fadil;" and "Freedom, equality—no peace without Fadil."

In front of the huge prison gates, Dr. Fadil Sulejmani himself spoke through a megaphone to the crowds, which were followed at a distance by police forces and representatives of the OSCE and UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force].

Sulejmani said, "We thank the great Albanian people for their continual support for the University of Tetovo. We Albanians of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], in our 50 years of struggle against the Slavic Macedonians and against mercenary and treacherous speakers of Albanian, have won for ourselves the University of Tetovo through self-denying efforts and many sacrifices for the realization of our national rights. This is a great day for us, and we must celebrate it today and always.

"The Slavic-Macedonian regime and the Albanian traitors are taking revenge for this and are sending us to prison. However, they have thereby accepted their shameful defeat and our magnificent victory. After these sacrifices, we will climb together to ever loftier heights. This is a great day for us, because we have secured our children's future. The University of Tetovo is a great victory for the Albanians in Macedonia and we must build on this victory." He then ordered: "Anybody who lays his hands on the University of Tetovo will burn his fingers."

"The imprisonment of professors, intellectuals, and teachers in Albanian education shows the weakness of

the enemy, and we must therefore not be frightened of these black prison doors."

Dr. Sulejmani's speech was regularly punctuated by cheers from the assembled people. "We will not give up Fadil!" "Down with the traitors!" "No peace without Fadil;" etc.

Milaim Fejziu, chairman of the University Senate, then spoke to the crowds and said, "Victory is ours. The world understands that the University of Tetovo is not what the Government of Macedonia thinks it is. Those who have imprisoned us at a show trial, in collaboration with Albanian mercenaries, think that they can imprison knowledge, but they do not know that they are imprisoning themselves."

Standing in front of the prison walls, the chairman of the Senate told the crowds to banish their fears, because this regime cannot imprison the University of Tetovo. We are proud to enter this prison today, he said, because we are aware that we are doing this for the people who are demanding a university. This is a joyful day for us, even though there are those who see it as tragic. At the end of his speech, Milaim Fejziu again instructed the crowds to stand firm in defense of the University of Tetovo and to support it financially, because our opponents want the university to fail.

After his speech, the song "Pledged to one another" echoed through the crowd, to loud cheers. Toward 1200 [1000 GMT] the prison gates opened, and Dr. Sulejmani and Mr. Fejziu were taken in to serve their sentences, to the anxiety, disgust, and tears of those present. Following calls from the Student Union organizers for the crowds to move on, a group of the most aggressive young people attacked the prison gates, trying to force them open. However, this group were removed at the urgent insistence of the organizers, and the imprisonment of the university intellectuals and the democratic protests of the people did not involve any unwelcome incidents.

Continuing their shouts, the crowd headed for the town square. Jusuf Mustafai, representative of the Student Union, thanked the participants for their solidarity in defense of the University of Tetovo and asked for an end to the meeting, because we will organize many other forms of protest in the next few days. However, the crowd was unwilling to disperse and demanded the immediate release of the rector. "Today, today!" and "We won't wait—no!"

The organizers left the rostrum, seen off by whistling, and the crowds almost lost control. A group of the most aggressive demonstrators headed for the offices of the Party for Democratic Prosperity, which is part

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of the government, in order to destroy them, but the organizers succeeded in sending them back. Another group damaged a police car.

The column of people again headed for Tetovo prison, where the organizers had called for a peaceful sit-in in front of the prison gates. The representatives of the Student Union informed those present that a delegation of parents of students and teaching staff would visit the representatives of the OSCE and UNPREDEP and the U.S. Embassy in Skopje over the imprisonment of the leaders of the University of Tetovo. Those present were invited to continue such peaceful protests in front of the prison gates day and night until the university leaders are released. They will surely be released soon, they said.

FYROM: Albanian Party Official Announces 'New Protests'

LD2307150296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1310 GMT 23 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 23 Jul (SRNA)—If someone thinks we will forget 22 July—when Fadil

Sulejmani, rector of the Tetovo-based Albanian university, began his prison sentence—he is terribly mistaken, said Bedredin Ibrahim, secretary of the Albanian People's Democratic Party.

He said there were countless other forms [of protest] and the Albanians would contact OSCE and UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia] representatives.

Ibrahim said "these organizations should carry out their tasks instead of saying how Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] has a healthy economy and how great the climate is."

"They are not carrying out their principal tasks as envisaged," Ibrahim said.

He announced new protests that would last until, as he said, "the Macedonian authorities are brought to their senses, until they realize that the Albanians are right and that there will be no peace in Macedonia and in neighboring countries without their goodwill."

Poland: Deputy Commander of IFOR Brigade Interviewed

WS2307130096 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA
in Polish 22 Jul 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Colonel Włodzimierz Sasiadek, deputy commander of the IFOR Polish-Nordic Brigade, by Krzysztof Szejner; place and date not given: "We Have a Good Position"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Szejner] Now that the brigade command has been reformed, you are responsible for the military-civilian aspect of the IFOR Nordic-Polish Brigade operations. What are your new duties?

[Sasiadek] As you have noted, the command system has undergone a substantial reform. Following the wish expressed by the states which delegated their troops to our brigade, a new commander—Swedish General Jan Bergstrom (former deputy of the previous commander)—has been appointed. Now that I have acquired more knowledge on the purely military functioning of the brigade, I was appointed to take over his previous duties. I basically establish, continue, and coordinate cooperation with civilian and military organizations on both sides of the division line in the region our brigade is responsible for. Those organizations include: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the UNHCR, the IPTF [International Police Task Force], the ECMM [European Community Monitoring Mission], the International Red Cross, and many others. Our estimates show there are around 600 such organizations in Bosnia. Our task is to make their job as easy as possible. I think this is a very difficult job, particularly in view of the upcoming elections.

[Szejner] You have touched upon the very interesting topic of the Bosnian elections. Has the brigade already begun preparing for them?

[Sasiadek] We are working intensely on a detailed scenario of the implementation of preelection tasks. There are still many questions which have to be answered. However, I believe that as information continues to flow in, it will be easier to make the right decisions. After all, the elections will be the culminating point of our mission. With that in mind, we are trying to prepare as best we can to implement the tasks we have been assigned within the frameworks of the Dayton peace agreement. They are very specific—we have to guarantee the freedom of the elections as well as the security of the voters and the voting stations, together with the people working in them. Finally, we have to guarantee the safety of thousands of international observers who will monitor the elections. After the elections, we will oversee the collection and transport of voting cards to the

stations—where they are to be counted. This is a very serious matter, but our performance up to now in implementing military assignments unequivocally shows that we have what it takes to carry out this nearly final task well.

[Szejner] Does the highest-ranking Polish officer in Bosnia believe the elections will make any sense given the circumstances? What I mean to say is that there are no independent media or a strong opposition, there is the problem of war criminals...

[Sasiadek] This is a purely political question, and I find it difficult to answer it unequivocally. If we look at the opinions of top politicians, we can see they are very determined to hold these elections in mid-September. However, having spent some time here, I know one thing—the political, or rather electoral awareness of the inhabitants of villages and towns is very small; I could even say it was practically nonexistent. What impact will this have on the elections? I would prefer not to judge that.

[Szejner] Would you like the situation prior to the elections to be better?

[Sasiadek] You can never have an ideal situation. You can always expect the political situation to be brighter, more lucid, especially if it concerns the very profound democratic act of voting. There is one thing we can be sure of—peace in Bosnia has been implemented—effectively. Thus, the next step is carrying out free elections, which are the indicator of democracy in any state. That act, naturally, has its specific political consequences, and we must trust that they will be an expression of the strong will on the part of the people to live together in peace.

[Szejner] What if there is no such political will?

[Sasiadek] Then the situation will be quite different, with grave consequences. Very serious decisions would then have to be made. I do not have the slightest idea how serious they would have to be in these conditions. I do believe, however, that these elections will be held and that we can establish at least a foundation of democracy in this country.

[Szejner] Thus, what aim has the brigade set for itself?

[Sasiadek] We have one basic aim—to create an adequate climate so as to prevent as many conflicts as possible in our zone so that everyone can say after the elections that they were free and fair. However, in the meantime, every day we face thousands of organizational and substantial problems which require solving as well and as expediently as possible. We still have a long way to go, and time is short.

[Sztejner] As you mentioned time—IPOR has been present in Bosnia for half a year now. There is talk of withdrawing the troops. Has the brigade done anything to prepare for a pullout?

[Sasiadek] Yes, we are preparing for a withdrawal. Like any good head of a household, apart from planning ongoing activities, we have to think about what might happen in a couple of months. The basic guideline for our activities is the question: How long will we perform our mission? For the time being, 21 December is the official date by which the IPOR forces are to pull out of Bosnia. This does not mean that on 21 December all soldiers will be gone. Even if we do begin to pull out, the process will take a couple of months at the minimum, at least as long as deploying the troops took—assuming, of course, that no unforeseen events unfold. I do think, however, that the mission will last until it becomes absolutely clear that peace has been implemented for good. For the time being, a special team has been established within the brigade; we have set general organization and time frames, now we are beginning to develop plans.

[Sztejner] What will the fate of the Polish soldiers be?

[Sasiadek] I myself do not know yet; it is difficult to answer that question definitely. This is still being considered. However, I can assure that the Poles will carry out any tasks assigned by the Brigade staff. If they do begin to withdraw, they will follow the optimal operational procedures for this type of tactical unit.

[Sztejner] You had the opportunity of commanding an international brigade for a dozen-odd days. This was not your first experience as a commander. You have commanded rocket and artillery forces, but that was at home. Do you see any differences in the style of command in our country and abroad?

[Sasiadek] I commanded the Nordic-Polish Brigade during the time First Commander General Finn Saermark-Thomsen was on leave, and, frankly speaking, I found it difficult. Overseeing operational activities together with activities in the civilian and military field is a difficult and complicated process. I can only say that nothing unusual occurred in the brigade in the days I was in charge. Nothing, at least, which would indicate that the first Pole in NATO history to take command over the Alliance's tactical unit messed things up.

[Sztejner] One last, personal question: What have you learned over these past six months?

[Sasiadek] That is a very broad question. First of all, I have learned to understand the mentality of NATO commanders. The half a year I have worked with them clearly shows that the process of making

decisions and assessing the situation in which they are made is different than currently exists in Poland. Normally, command is exercised here on the basis of an evaluation of documents reaching the proper divisions, commanders, or their deputies. Once the information is "digested," problems are analyzed and discussed. This takes much more time than in Poland. Once a decision is made, the process reverses. Orders are documented and dispatched to superiors. Thanks to multichannel communication systems, from faxes to computer networks, this stage is much shorter. Thus, I have become acquainted with a wide range of issues related to technical equipment and serving the decisionmaking process. This is a huge network, which took 2-3 months to synchronize in the past. Today it is effective, which makes all of us here at the command headquarters satisfied. I have also polished my language skills. I must admit that on my way to the mission I was afraid whether I would manage, particularly in the most difficult, early phase. Now I speak the language fluently enough not only to hold conversations, but to understand and issue orders. I am not the only student; all the other Poles in the staff are learning, too. Most interesting of all, the role played by the Polish officers in the brigade staff is very different from what it was half a year ago, when we started by learning all we needed from our NATO colleagues. Now our situation is very different. Our presence is felt, we are asked many questions... As much as 80 percent of the brigade staff have been replaced and we, Poles, remain practically the only contingent which is to carry on operations for the next six months. Thus, our skills in the area of cooperating with other nations are particularly important now. I do not claim that we are passing on our experience to them because they know their own NATO procedures very well... However, we are helping new officers master the duties they will have to perform over the next six months. This gives both sides satisfaction.

[Sztejner] You cannot beat a Pole?

[Sasiadek] Nobody wants to beat anyone here. Everyone is rather expecting us to help. We give them our support every day. I think this is a very good moment to improve the reputation of Polish officers in the eyes of NATO commanders. I believe the process will bear fruit, and I hope that someone someday will mention the fact that the Poles successfully undertook the task of "running" the brigade at a time the staff was being restructured.

[Sztejner] Thank you for the interview.

Poland: Leading Figures Comment on Concordat Issue

LD2107144896 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1400 GMT 21 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych has said that, as far as he is concerned, the issue of the concordat is clear from the legal and formal point of view. The Sejm will return to the matter after the constitutional referendum.

In the opinion of Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati, if any new circumstances appear, the Sejm could return to the concordat issue within the coming two months.

Former President Lech Walesa expressed the opinion that the concordat is being treated as a game by the forces currently in power in Poland.

Poland: ROP Seeks Concordat Ratification Before Elections

LD2107154296 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1336 GMT 21 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 21 Jul—The Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP] thinks the ratification of the concordat agreement signed three years ago should take place before the parliamentary elections. ROP leader Jan Olszewski said at a news conference in Warsaw on 21 July that the deputies from the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and the Freedom Union [UW] bear joint responsibility with the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] for preventing the ratification of the concordat. The news conference was devoted to the statement issued by the papal nuncio's office in Poland on the issue.

The ROP asked all "deputies of goodwill" to take resolute steps to bring about the ratification of the concordat before the end of the current parliamentary term of office. Poland's state imperative and the standing of the republic require that the concordat ratification should not become an object of political games and electioneering, the ROP statement says.

According to the ROP, "the key to a positive solution of the concordat issue is in the hands of political parties which constitute the Sejm majority but which have thus far not shown sufficient political will." According to Olszewski, the SLD and the Labor Union [UP] were able to push through their position during the [3 July] vote on the concordat because they were helped by those deputies who "failed to attend parliamentary votes on the concordat issue or voted against their party whip." This particularly concerns the PSL and the UW, Olszewski said.

The political games played by the SLD and its sympathizers aimed at preventing the ratification of the concordat compromise the Polish diplomatic service and undermine Poland's credibility in the international arena, the ROP leader believes.

Poland: Cimoszewicz Pleased With Papal Nuncio's Statement

LD2207181496 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 22 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz thinks that the statement by the papal nuncio's office on the Concordat issue is a manifestation of will to find a positive solution. The head of the government said that he intends to encourage the minister of foreign affairs to resume correspondence with the Vatican on the Concordat as a matter of urgency.

[Begin Cimoszewicz recording] I am very pleased with the contents of the nuncio's statement. It seems that a possible solution can be found. This was the aim of the government initiatives put forward by the minister of foreign affairs, on my instruction, leading toward the acceptance by both sides of legally binding interpretation of all the decisions contained in the Concordat—signed but not ratified—which may arouse doubt or make the impression of being ambiguous. Bearing in mind the statement issued by the nuncio's office, I intend to encourage the minister of foreign affairs to urgently resume correspondence in order to reach a joint, a jointly acceptable solution, which would also be acceptable to the majority of our society. [end recording]

Poland: SLD Deputy Notes Problems With Concordat

LD2207192696 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1700 GMT 22 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] Deputy Tadeusz Iwinski has told Polish radio that the accusation of playing political games, contained in a statement issued by the papal nuncio's office yesterday, is untrue. The alliance deputies have very specific legal reservations with regard to the Concordat.

[Begin Iwinski recording] First, the incompatibility with the Basic Law—Article 82 of the Small [Interim] Constitution on the division between the Church and the State in Poland today. The Concordat contains a formula of autonomy and independence. This is an obvious discrepancy. The civil rights ombudsman and the Sejm have admitted this. I have already said this.

Second, the Concordat does not contain explanations on matters which are particularly interesting and important. It contains new provisions, for example, a possibility of introducing religion in nursery schools. Consequently, who would pay for this? So there are financial matters to resolve.

Finally, the Concordat, Article 22—this is in fact the third issue—could limit the powers of parliament with regard to taxation matters and tax allowances.

We are not opposed to the Concordat as such, but are against this specific version. Of course, renegotiation would be the best solution. However, perhaps a bilateral declaration could clarify these doubts. For the time being, the Sejm resolution passed on 3 July is in force. It says that the issue of the Concordat will again be discussed after the constitutional referendum. [end recording]

Poland: Sejm Speaker Says Concordat Vote Not Possible 'Soon'

LD2407104496 Warsaw Third Program Radio
Network in Polish 0900 GMT 24 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sejm speaker has said he does not think it is possible for the house to return to the matter of the Concordat ratification soon because it is necessary to clarify many doubts and reservations voiced by deputies first. In an interview for Polish radio, the speaker said the matter would not reach the Sejm earlier than in three months' time also for formal and legal reasons.

Several weeks ago the Sejm decided, mainly due to the votes cast by the left-wing, that the vote on possible Concordat ratification would be held only after the new constitution is adopted.

A few days ago Foreign Affairs Minister Dariusz Rosati expressed the opinion that there was a possibility for the Sejm to deal with the Concordat issue before the adoption of the new basic law.

Poland: German Ownership of Polish Publications Surveyed

WS2207131496 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 22 Jul 96 p 16

[Article by Michal Marys: "Passauer Neue Presse; the Nationwide Regional Giant"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Most of the readers of the 12 largest-circulation Polish regional dailies do not suspect that the publications are owned by the German Passauer Neue Presse group.

Such a conclusion can be drawn from a poll carried out by TRYBUNA SLASKA, after the daily was taken over by the Germans. "Readers did not notice any change in the publication. They replied that foreign capital does not have any influence on what is published in our daily," says Kazimierz Borgiel, director of the Upper Silesian Press Society, the TRYBUNA SLASKA publisher.

A Super Transaction With Hersant

The Passauer Neue Presse bought TRYBUNA SLASKA (the largest-circulation regional daily in Poland)—just as many other publications—from Robert Hersant, the late French press mogul. It is still believed that the "wholesale" transaction, concluded in September 1994, was the biggest in the history of the Polish press. The Germans paid almost 100 million German marks for majority stakes in such publications as DZIENNIK BALTYCKI and WIECZOR WYBRZEZA in Gdansk, DZIENNIK LODZKI and EXPRESS ILUSTROWANY in Lodz, DZIENNIK ZACHODNI and TRYBUNA SLASKA in Katowice, and GAZETA KRAKOWSKA and TEMPO in Krakow.

Most of these dailies were doing very well; the primary reason why Hersant decided to get rid of all of them was the financial troubles of the concern in France. The sum involved puts this transaction on a par with the recent sale of the 51-percent stake in RZECZPOSPOLITA for \$45 million. Incidentally, the seller was also the Hersant group, and the buyer was the Norwegian concern of Orkla.

With Small Steps

[passage omitted] Before the spectacular transaction with Hersant, the Germans purchased 25 percent of the shares of DZIENNIK POLSKI in Krakow (this is the only newspaper in which they still have only a minority holding) and half of the shares of GAZETA ROBOTNICZA in Wroclaw (now they have a majority stake there). Then they bought GAZETA POZNANSKA and EXPRESS POZNANSKI.

The Twelve Favorite Children

In all the countries where it operates, the Passauer Neue Presse invests exclusively in regional press. It is not going to depart from this principle in Poland. "We do not want to buy more publications in Poland. What we want to do is develop the ones which we already have," says Director Mathie Cosson. He assures that Passauer-controlled publications will stay away from politics. "Regional press must be nonpolitical."

So far the concern has invested 150 million German marks in our country. In the spring of 1995, it began

production in its printing plant in Krakow. It is the largest of the four printing plants which the concern owns in Poland. The other three are located in Lodz, Wroclaw, and Gdansk.

Asked to which publications the Germans attach the greatest importance and on which dailies they pin their greatest hopes, Director Mathie Cosson says: "We are like a mother who loves all of her children equally."

To Villages and Small Towns

Publishers of the dailies taken over by the Passauer Neue Presse agree that the owner does not exert any influence where contents of the publications are concerned. Kazimierz Borgiel, director general of the Upper Silesian Press Society, which is the publisher of TRYBUNA SLASKA, assures that the final decision on the appointment of the chief editor lies with the supervisory board, which is dominated by Poles. An interesting thing is that Director Borgiel believes that its most serious rival is DZIENNIK ZACHODNI, which is also owned by the Passauer Neue Presse. Neither publication tends to undertake joint projects.

Borgiel expects that thanks to the Passauer Neue Presse, it will be easier to build a printing plant in Katowice and improve distribution. The latter will be possible after Ruch [the largest press distribution company] is privatized; it is to be taken over by the French company of Hachette, with which the Passauer Neue Presse maintains good contacts.

The biggest investment in Lodz (30 billion old zlotys) was the purchase of a group of buildings—a printing plant and editorial offices. However, the publisher of DZIENNIK LODZKI and EXPRESS ILUSTROWANY assures that the money came from profits made by the two dailies. There is a personnel link between the two dailies in Lodz; Janusz Pienkowski is the director of the two publishing companies. "The Passauer Neue Presse does not impose anything on us. We have ourselves decided that regional editions will be the primary development direction. We want all small towns to have their own editions of our dailies," Pienkowski says. DZIENNIK is now available in three different editions: as DZIENNIK LODZKI, DZIENNIK SIERADZKI, and DZIENNIK PIOTRKOWSKI. Pabianice and Zgierz will have their own editions very soon. Separate editions will also be prepared for Zdunska Wola and Wielun, Sieradz Voivodship.

However, as part of an economy package, it has been decided that the television schedule supplement prepared in the editorial office in Warsaw will be the same for both DZIENNIK and EXPRESS.

Poland: German Investor Buys Shares in Poznan Regional Dailies

WS2407120696 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 24 Jul 96 p 15

[Report by Elzbieta Glapiak in Poznan: "The Passauer Neue Presse; The German GAZETA POZNANSKA"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The German Passauer Neue Presse concern has 95 percent of the shares in the Fibak Investment Group, which is the publisher of GAZETA POZNANSKA and EXPRESS POZNANSKI.

GAZETA POZNANSKA made known the composition of the shareholders yesterday. In line with our information, the Passauer Neue Presse began to gradually buy out the shares of the Fibak Investment Group back in 1994, that is, when Wojciech Fibak, one of the biggest shareholders of the publisher, backed out from the firm. Despite that, the company kept its name — the Fibak Investment Group.

Last Thursday the Passauer Neue Presse bought a bloc of shares from Marek Modecki, one of the four shareholders who took over both dailies in 1989. The value of the transaction was not revealed. The Passauer Neue Presse merely announced that it holds 95 percent of the Fibak Investment Group shares. The remaining 5 percent were kept by Krzysztof Bielewicz, chairman of the board and director general of the publishing company. He is giving assurances that the Germans have given him a free hand as far as running the company is concerned.

"The Germans decided to buy GAZETA POZNANSKA because of its good position on the readership and advertising market," we were told by Beata Bialy, director of the Polska Presse company, which represents the Passauer Neue Presse concern in Poland. "We did not hold talks with any other publication in this region," Bialy added. According to her, the concern intends to stay away from the daily's internal policies and methods of running the company. It is interested in strengthening its position in the region by adding new editions and by increasing the number of representative offices in the biggest towns of the Wielkopolska region. The title, the masthead caption, and the graphic layout of the daily will remain unchanged.

GAZETA POZNANSKA Director General Ryszard Chomicz would not comment on the fact that the Passauer Neue Presse had taken over the daily.

It is worth recalling that in September 1994 the Germans bought stakes in eight Polish regional papers from Robert Hersant, a French press mogul. Now they own a total of 12 publications.

Poland: Sole Unmanned Submersible Built in Szczecin

*LD2307171596 Warsaw TV Polonia Network
in Polish 1500 GMT 23 Jul 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Poland's only unmanned underwater vehicle named Krab has been built at the Institute of Technology and Oceanic Engineering in Szczecin. It can descend to a depth of almost 200 meters.

Krab can shoot film, thanks to special underwater cameras. The police have shown interest using it to

look for the bodies of people who have drowned. Using Krab, archeologists have already managed to examine the wrecks of vessels lying at the bottom of the the Bay of Gdansk. Ecologists wishing to survey the bottom of the Baltic Sea are also interested in the vehicle. During World War II several hundred thousand tonnes of chemical bombs ended up there and they are polluting the sea water to this very day. [video shows the small open metal-framed vehicle being lowered into the water by two or three men and some underwater shots dated 30 Sep 95]

Romania: Tinca Warns of Discrimination in NATO Enlargement

BR2407123896 Paris LE FIGARO in French
24 Jul 96 p 4

[Report on interview with Romanian Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca by Laure Mandeville in Bucharest; date not given: "Romania Wants NATO at Any Cost"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Romanian Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca states: "Even if NATO keeps us waiting because of our dark eyes, we will continue to look to the West." Opening wide what are in fact his own blue eyes, he insists that Romania "has no other alternative but to join the Atlantic alliance. Our country is a Romance pocket and, as far as I know, the Latins have always been in the West!" [passage omitted]

When he receives guests in the imposing Defense Ministry, just opposite the megalithic Palace of the People which dates from Ceaucescu's era, Minister Gheorghe Tinca always gets straight to the point: "Since the end of the Cold War, security in Central Europe has been uncertain. To the West is a well-structured zone, but to the East still exists the great Russian power which, despite its problems, continues to exert an influence on world security and tries to impose its own values on others. Those who are in the middle lack security. Without shelter, without certainty, it will be very hard for them to continue with the reforms that have begun. We believe that this certainty can only come from NATO."

Russia is one of the main threats to Romanian security. Unlike some of their more discreet East European neighbors, the Romanians, and in this case Gheorghe Tinca, have no hesitation about saying loud and clear: "They are not our enemies, but they are a source of risk. If Central Europe's membership in the Western world is not stated clearly then certain Russian conservatives could think that perhaps there is still something here for them in the way of territory or a way of restoring their influence."

Russian and Hungarian Clouds on the Horizon

Could the frustration of not having been accepted by the West lead to an alliance with Moscow born out of desperation? While wanting "good relations with the Russians," Tinca categorically rules out the possibility of an alliance: "Our people have an instinct for self-preservation in their blood which means that we will no longer accept Russian domination. Anyone seeking to build their foreign policy on the back of privileged relations with Russia would be rejected by the people, 95 percent of whom are hoping for NATO membership."

However, there is another cloud on Romania's horizon: Hungary. Despite what Tinca describes as "exceptional military and economic relations," dealings between Bucharest and Budapest remain strained. Moreover, the minister does not hide his annoyance when asked about the status of the Hungarian minority in Romanian Transylvania. He positively seethes at the thought of Hungary's joining NATO while Romania is excluded: "The anti-Romanian lobby in the United States is already very powerful. But if Hungary gets into NATO it would assume an importance that would harm our interests. Just imagine if the Hungarians were on the inside and we were on the outside. They could argue for special relations between Budapest and Romanian Transylvania. The minority problem would then become a security problem that would create a zone of instability in the region." Logical conclusion: "We need the concomitant entry of both countries" to allay any risk of sideslipping.

It is hard to know whether Mr. Tinca's warnings will be heard by the West. The minister is concerned that Germany's position on the enlargement tends to favor the countries of the center-east rather than of the southeast. That leaves the United States and especially France "which is very well aware of the specific nature of our French-speaking nation. We agree with Paris that any excessive haste could lead to mistakes being made. It is essential that we change NATO at the same time as enlarging it." In other words, he appears to be saying that a delayed enlargement open to everyone would be better than a hasty enlargement in which some countries would be excluded. [passage omitted]

Romania: PDSR Discusses Strategy for Parliamentary Elections

AU1907155596 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
15 Jul 96 pp 1, 4

[Report by Adrian Ursu: "Party of Social Democracy of Romania Is Again Disregarding President Iliescu's Words—The Request To 'Clean' the Electoral Lists Formulated by the Head of State Is Ignored by the Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Party of Social Democracy of Romania [PDSR] Standing Delegation met on Friday 12 July in its Atena street headquarters to outline the basic principles of the electoral campaign for the autumn 1996 elections. For the PDSR members, the failure in the local elections does not seem to be a wound that time will heal. That is why the discussions about the results that were much below expectations (considering the expenditure on propaganda and logistics) obtained at June elections continued at the marathon meeting

held on Friday. To avoid being accused of failing to take measures aimed at punishing all those who are to be blamed for these results, but also to protect higher officials in the party who could be incriminated regarding this lack of success, local organizations and smaller chiefs in provinces were properly scolded. The prefect of Constanta was the most severely punished when the PSDR stopped supporting him (an act that might lead to his demotion by the premier) following the lamentable defeat the party suffered in the seaside county. Moreover, in order to eliminate any suspicion of manipulation in the elections and for a better preparation of the next campaign, the participants at the meeting reiterated their request to separate (wherever possible) the position of president of the county organization from that of county prefect.

The new vice president of the party, Nicolae Vacaroiu (prime minister), was given the task of elaborating the PSDR's economic strategy for the elections. Could the top party officials have imagined that the prime minister's rich experience in ruining the national economy is a trump card in the hands of the PSDR for winning the elections in November? We do not doubt for a moment that the measures of social protection that the PSDR-member prime minister announced on Friday—as measures that he intends to promote for electoral purposes—will, in the eyes of the Romanians, enjoy the complete credibility conferred by the four years of raising the standard of living of the majority of the population to the highest peaks of... poverty.

At the Friday meeting, the PSDR also established the criteria for designating the candidates for the parliamentary elections. According to some Standing Delegation sources, the participants assessed that it is necessary to increase the proportion of young people (up to the age of 40) and of women on the lists of candidates. It was decided that as many intellectuals as possible will be designated in order to attract the urban electorate, which refrained from putting the stamp on the PSDR list at the local elections. According to the same sources, there was no mention of the criteria that President Ion Iliescu enumerated at the recent meeting with the Central Executive Bureau of the party. At that meeting, the head of state, in an effort to show strength before the PSDR members, told them that the condition for him to run in the presidential elections under the sign of three roses [the PSDR's symbol] is for them to eliminate some names that have been discredited through corruption scandals. The head of state also asked the members of the party leadership to unequivocally choose between business and politics. Proving that their sleep has not been disturbed by the president's words and that they are pretty sure of the relation of dependence that has

been established between them and the head of state, the PSDR members impassively proceeded to the establishment of criteria for designating the candidates, disregarding the requirements coming from Cotroceni [the presidency]. This is not surprising in the least, considering that, on the one hand, if such requirements were to be implemented, the PSDR lists would be completely different from those in 1992. On the other hand, the PSDR members who fall back on this attitude of defying the president's words were also convinced on other occasions (the most eloquent example being the Shareholders Supervisory Board, AGA) that even if Mr. Iliescu gets upset, he will nevertheless run on their list. In that case, why should they make spectacular gestures?

Romania: PD Official Claims PSDR Making 'Advances' to UDMR

AU2307091296 Bucharest AZI in Romanian
19 Jul 96 p 6

[“Note” by Teodora Georgescu: “The Social Democracy Party of Romania Is Covertly Making Advances to the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania”]

[FBIS Translated Text] Adrian Severin [vice president of the Democratic Party, PD] is showing great composure vis-a-vis the famous “Budapest Declaration.” Considering that it has good aspects and positive messages as well as bad ones—such as “those less clear compromise formulas”—the PD deputy considers that one should not make such a great fuss about the declaration and should not become hysterical about certain statements, which “we must interpret in the light of Romania's Constitution and from the angle of international standards.” As a concrete example, Severin claims that “the Hungarian Government's interest in the minorities can be interpreted through Article 7 of Romania's Constitution, which states that the Romanian state takes steps to ensure that the minorities preserve their ethnic identity.” In Adrian Severin's opinion, we should not fear the chapter on autonomy either, because “it does not mean autonomy on ethnic criteria, something that would not be recognized internationally.” Speaking on behalf of the PD, Adrian Severin claims that this interpretation is made by the ruling party, which “beyond such bellicose statements for public consumption, is making advances to the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR].”

Romania: PL '93 Leader Presents National Liberal Alliance Goals

AU1907200496 Bucharest COTIDIANUL
in Romanian 16 Jul 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Dinu Patriciu, leader of the National Party '93, by Lucian Gheorghiu; place and date not given: "We Can Win in the First Round"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the legislature is on vacation and the local elections have gone down "in history," the political scene is in complete turmoil. Alliances are being set up or broken, candidacies for the office of president are being announced, and proposals for the list of parliamentarians or for the "Cotroceni" [presidency] are being made. One of the "popular" politicians in this period is no doubt Dinu Patriciu, leader of the Liberal Party '93 [PL '93], a party that together with the Civic Alliance Party [PAC] recently set up the National Liberal Alliance [ANL], this grouping having become the liberal pole of the opposition. Mr. Dinu Patriciu was kind enough to grant us an interview regarding the ANL and some important aspects of Romanian politics.

[Gheorghiu] What signals do you get from the PL '93 branches in the provinces now, three days after the ANL has been set up?

[Patriciu] Excellent. People have started creating county structures of the alliance. Members of the PL '93 get along very well with those of the PAC. I do not think we will have any problems.

[Gheorghiu] The ANL is attacked both by those in power and by some groups in the opposition. The first are to be expected. What about the others...

[Patriciu] I have not noticed attacks, just a sort of fear from the third pole of the opposition, although I believe and hope that there will be very good cooperation between us and the social democratic and Christian democratic poles of the opposition. The proposals that we have forwarded will assist in this idea. A ruling pact among the three poles of the opposition after the elections would collect over 50 percent of the votes necessary to form a cabinet. Our other proposal was also to nominate, through the democratic vote of the electors, a sole candidate of the opposition for the office of president.

[Gheorghiu] Do you believe that the competitors who have already announced their candidacy will examine this issue and not invoke the time factor?

[Patriciu] Let us not forget that in 1992, when Emil Constantinescu [president of the Democratic Convention of Romania, CDR] was nominated as CDR candidate, the

time until the elections was very short, and at that time he was completely unknown.

[Gheorghiu] What is the advantage of having a sole candidate for the entire opposition running in the presidential elections?

[Patriciu] He has the possibility of winning in the first round.

[Gheorghiu] The PNTCD [National Peasant Christian Democratic Party], at the news conference held on Monday, 15 July, claimed that it is not the right time to run on different lists and with different programs for the autumn elections. Moreover, they say that you are coming up now with a proposal that you did not agree to before, and that is why you withdrew from the Convention.

[Patriciu] Owing to the force of circumstances, the PNTCD dominates the alliance. The CDR does not have the representation of the other two directions specific to democracy. The Convention is just the Christian Democratic pole of the opposition. As regards my proposal, in this case the PNTCD members are mistaken. At that time we were talking about a sole candidate for the CDR, while now we are talking about and proposing a sole candidate for the entire opposition.

[Gheorghiu] Regarding this sole candidate for the entire opposition, a few days ago you mentioned the names of [PNTCD leaders] Ion Ratiu and Radu Vasile. What is your argument in favor of this proposal?

[Patriciu] Ion Ratiu is one of the traditional PNTCD leaders, and one of those with the most pronounced sense of democratic fair play in Romania. His entire personality is dominated by respect for democratic norms, and he is part of those models that must be followed. Therefore, I believe that he could be an excellent presidential candidate. Radu Vasile is one of the PNTCD's pillars. It is thus normal that the strongest party in the CDR should run a candidate.

[Gheorghiu] Returning to the liberal pole of the opposition, that is to the ANL, in the past few days Mr. Mircea Ionescu Quintus [president of National Liberal Party, PNL] was announcing through the mass media that PL '93 branches are incorporating into the PNL. What is the real situation?

[Patriciu] We are used by now to the unfounded declarations of those who represent the group of interests called the PNL. I have never understood and will never understand why the PNTCD accepts an association with these people. Given the fact that we are talking about local matters, we have never made public the scores of cases in which PNL organizations—where there are still

such organizations—have come over to us entirely, together with their headquarters. But if those in the PNL continue, in a dishonest manner, to spread such misinformation, we will make it public.

[Gheorghiu] It seems to me that the planned alliance with the PDAR [Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania], MER [Romanian Ecologist Movement], and others has been dropped...

[Patriciu] Not at all. There are continuous talks, but we cannot abandon our principles that have been established in the protocol and in the statute of the alliance.

[Gheorghiu] With what new elements does the ANL come to the electorate?

[Patriciu] With a realistic ruling program and with objective and concrete data. In the event the liberal ruling program is applied, the profit taxes must be and can be cut by 5 percent, the average income taxes by 10 percent, and the indirect taxes by half, first of all the value added tax. This program also stipulates tax exemption for technological imports, and the growth of capital should also be exempt from taxes. Only such a fiscal rules, together with the other provisions of the program, will be able to bring about a sudden improvement in our economy. The other provisions also stipulate that in a maximum of six months all active State Property Fund stocks should be sold, decentralization of the economy achieved, and support should be granted to small industry and services in the rural areas.

[Gheorghiu] At first glance the program looks very good, and I think that there are also people who can implement it. Let us not forget, however, that in the local elections, where even the political adversaries admitted that you are the most capable candidate and the one with the best program, the result of the elections were not favorable to you. What was the explanation then, and how do you plan to avoid a repetition of that situation?

[Patriciu] Yes, during the local elections there was an extremely strong political polarization, and this was the

main motivation in Bucharest, where fear of a victory by Ilie Nastase made people vote for the CDR candidate.

Things are different in parliamentary elections. Three blocks of the opposition, the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Liberals, will make this polarization disappear. Moreover, now the electorate will have to vote for a whole list, and not just choose from mayoral candidates.

[Gheorghiu] Tell us now, in conclusion: What question did you expect me to ask you, which I did not ask? You ask it, and answer it at the same time.

[Patriciu] We are still talking about the ruling program, its institutional part.

The institutional reform, the current road that we have been traveling for the past six years, is unconvincing; it is too contorted and full of traps. There is legislation that uses half measures in terms of program and economic regulations; the framework of economic norms is extremely conservative, hampering positive economic development; and there is an extremely centralized administration. This is what we have now.

There is an alternative to all this, namely reform in the interests of the citizen, and these interests must come before the interests of the state. We have taken institutions and practices from developed capitalist countries and adapted them to a society in which, in a manner similar to Third World countries, the state is the central goal. We have reached a reform that refers to itself and ignores people's needs; it will eliminate itself. Reform does not mean a road to nowhere, a third road between capitalism and socialism, which leads only to poverty. The average salary in our country is \$80, while prices are identical with those in the West. I believe that by implementing our program we will be able to reach an average salary of \$300-400 in two years, just like some other ex-communist countries. That is why our electoral slogan is: "Choose the Right Way!"

Federal**FRY: Bosnian Trade Delegation Meets With Milosevic***MS2407083696 London FINANCIAL TIMES
in English 24 Jul 96 p 2*

[Report by Laura Silber: "Bosnia and Belgrade Seek To Rebuild Ties"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade—A high level trade delegation from Bosnia yesterday met their opposite numbers in Belgrade in the first such visit since war began four years ago. Mr Ejup Ganic, Bosnia's vice-president, led a 15-strong delegation of trade officials and senior politicians in a two-day visit aimed at forging economic links with the Serbian regime, widely seen as responsible for fomenting war in former Yugoslavia.

"It is a risky step for me, but a very safe and sure step for Bosnia-Herzegovina," said Mr Ganic, before nearly three hours of talks with President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia.

Diplomats hailed Mr Ganic's mission, which included ministers from the Moslem-Croat Federation and Bosnian businessmen, as an important step towards establishing lasting peace in the Balkans.

The Bosnian visit was aimed at further isolating the Bosnian Serb leadership by establishing direct ties between Belgrade and Sarajevo. It was announced last week by Mr Richard Holbrooke, the US envoy, during a round of shuttle diplomacy primarily focused on ousting Mr Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader wanted for war crimes.

Diplomats said the visit was also intended to step up pressure on Mr Milosevic, who wants to win recognition for Serb-led Yugoslavia and rejoin international financial institutions. "Right now, the country is facing several suits abroad. Milosevic hopes that the visit will help cool off the situation," said a western diplomat. "The two countries are closer than before. It was a business-oriented meeting," Mr Ganic said after talks with Mr Milosevic, adding that the two countries had already recognised each other.

In spite of the agreement between the Moslem-led Bosnian government and Serb-led Yugoslavia last November in Dayton to establish diplomatic, trade and communications links, little headway has been made so far.

Under tight security, Mr Ganic's delegation, which included Bosnian banking officials and company managers, also held talks with the Serbian Chamber of Commerce and local businessmen. The two sides discussed restoring air, rail and telephone links.

Mr Vlatko Stojilkovic, head of the Serbian Chamber of Economy, said yesterday: "Serbian companies are ready to participate in the reconstruction of Bosnia."

His counterpart from Bosnia Mr Ante Domazet, said he was counting on the politicians in the delegation to create the framework to renew economic co-operation.

Bosnia has been promised nearly \$5bn in reconstruction aid over the next four years, but Serb-led Yugoslavia remains cut off from all international financial organisations. After 41 months of economic sanctions, which were suspended last November, and footing the bill for the Serb forces fighting in Croatia and Bosnia, the flagging Serbian economy would welcome any foreign trade.

FRY: Official Statement on Talks With Muslim-Croat Federation*LD2307152296 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1112 GMT 23 Jul 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 23 Jul (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Milan Milutinovic held talks in Belgrade today with Jadranko Prlic, minister of foreign affairs of the Muslim-Croat federation. These talks represent the continuation of dialogue on issues of mutual interest.

The [Yugoslav] Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a statement saying that both sides emphasized the importance of the further and consistent implementation of the Dayton-Paris peace agreement and particularly of creating conditions for free elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for constitutional building of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its equal entities [Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation] and for establishing democratic institutions on the basis of respecting the equality of the three constitutive nations.

They also expressed their readiness to continue making efforts toward the gradual normalization of relations between the two sides and examined measures that ought to be taken in this respect.

They laid particular emphasis on the fact that continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ought to be respected and that Bosnia-Herzegovina should display appropriate conduct in international institutions.

The importance attached by both sides to the gradual reestablishment of ties and cooperation was confirmed, because the sides are convinced that this is in their mutual interest.

The talks between the two ministers were held in an atmosphere of openness, understanding and mutual

respect. They also agreed to continue dialogue at all levels and on all issues.

FRY: Cooperation Talks With Bosnia Federation Group Reported

LD2307171396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1501 GMT 23 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 23 Jul (TANJUG)—A business and political delegation of the Muslim-Croat Federation arrived today on a two-day visit to Belgrade where it had a series of meetings with senior representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia.

The delegation which is led by Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, was received by Deputy Federal Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic on arrival in Belgrade this morning.

During the talks emphasis was placed on the importance of further involvement in order to consistently implement the Dayton-Paris peace agreement on peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina so as to preserve the positive results achieved so far and pave the way for lasting peace and stability in the region.

Special attention in the talks was devoted to the renewal of economic links and cooperation. Here the two sides' delegations, it was agreed, had concrete talks in the chambers of commerce of Serbia and Yugoslavia and in the departments of transport and industry.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic also received Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and Jadranko Pric, the foreign minister, in Belgrade today. He also received their hosts, Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic, who informed him of the program and content of the talks which are taking place and which are designed to normalize relations and establish cooperation between Belgrade and Sarajevo.

To this end numerous business people from Serbia and Bosnia had parallel talks today on a series of questions relating to concrete reciprocal economic cooperation.

President Milosevic stressed during the talks that the establishment of economic cooperation between numerous companies on both sides is very important for the overall normalization of relations and the stabilization of the situation in the region.

It was particularly stressed that specific agreements on establishing telephone, air, rail, road, and postal and telecommunications links will enable the more rapid realization of the economic agreements which are anticipated and also greatly contribute to creating the

conditions for the free movement of people, goods, information, and capital in the interests of economic recovery of the many business enterprises in the region, and the more rapid return of refugees and the general normalization of everyday life.

The end of the war, which was achieved by the Dayton peace agreement, it was said in the talks, has created the conditions for all potential now to be directed toward economic and cultural recovery and development and to resolving all remaining outstanding problems in a constructive manner.

In the course of the dialogue both sides positively assessed the very great importance of this first step which should open up a continuing process of realizing and promoting cooperation.

Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Milan Milutinovic had a separate meeting in Belgrade today with Jadranko Pric, minister of foreign affairs of the Muslim-Croat Federation.

Both sides emphasized the importance of the further and consistent implementation of the Dayton-Paris peace agreement and particularly of creating conditions for free elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the constitutional building of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its equal entities, and for establishing democratic institutions on the basis of respecting the equality of the three constitutive nations.

They also expressed their readiness to continue making efforts toward the gradual normalization of relations between the two sides and examined measures that ought to be taken in this respect.

Ministers Milutinovic and Pric agreed that citizens of the two sides may freely travel with their passports issued by the relevant authorities of their countries, without any additional formalities.

It was said that relevant Yugoslav bodies have taken all the measures necessary to enable refugees from Bosnia staying in Yugoslavia to vote in the general Bosnia-Herzegovina elections on 14 September.

They laid particular emphasis on the fact that continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ought to be respected and that Bosnia-Herzegovina should display appropriate conduct in international institutions.

The importance attached by both sides to the gradual reestablishment of ties and cooperation was confirmed, because the sides are convinced that this is in their mutual interest.

Vlado Stojiljkovic, chairman of the Serbian Chamber of Economy, held talks with businessmen from the Muslim-Croat federation who arrived in Belgrade today.

He stressed that economic reasons exist for the reestablishment of disrupted business links and added that our firms are ready to take part in the reconstruction of Bosnia.

Stojiljkovic said that "for a long time we lived together and built business relations which can be reestablished and improved after the restoration of peace."

He also urged reconstruction of the infrastructure, primarily in the sphere of traffic and telecommunications, which could result in the speedy signing of concrete business agreements.

Seadeta Ceric, head of the Muslim-Croat Federation's economic delegation and deputy minister for foreign trade and international communications, said that today's visit is the beginning of future cooperation. She added that a legal framework and conditions for establishing future economic ties should be created.

Anto Domazet, deputy chairman of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Economic Chamber, said that politicians should lay institutional foundations for the revival of economic cooperation. He added that Yugoslav enterprises, specifically construction companies, would have the opportunity to take part in the reconstruction and development of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that companies from these two countries had already been established.

Representatives of the National Bank, the Sarajevo Merchant Bank, salt plants from Tuzla, the Feroelektro factory, Agrokomerc company, the Energoinvest enterprise, rail companies, the post office and airlines are in the Muslim-Croat federation delegation.

Managers of the Serbian Post, Telegraph and Telephone, the Yugoslav Airlines, the Yugoslav Railways, Grmec, Sartida and leading banks attended the meeting in the Serbian Economic Chamber.

It was announced that phone links between Belgrade and Sarajevo could be established very soon.

It is expected that the economic delegation of the Muslim-Croat Federation will resume talks with Yugoslav businessmen tomorrow.

FRY: Prlic Says Two Important Issues Remain Unresolved

AU2307200296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 23 Jul 96

[Report by Jasna Bozic from Belgrade]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following three-hour closed-door talks in the building [words indistinct] Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Deputy Federal Prime

Minister Nikola Sainovic, and Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic, Ejup Ganic, who headed the Bosnian delegation in Belgrade, said: We discussed a greater degree of diplomatic cooperation and the issue is not closed. This is a visit which will initiate a new series of reality checks and talks. Today we broached all issues crucial for establishing peace in the area, Ganic said.

Bosnian Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic, who also attended the talks, was much more concrete in his statement. Prlic said that a step had been taken toward establishing diplomatic relations, but that the Bosnian delegation was not entirely satisfied because diplomatic relations still have not been established. Two important issues remain to be resolved, on which the Yugoslav side is insisting: the withdrawal of Bosnia-Herzegovina's lawsuit filed in The Hague and the recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's continuity. These are two issues that we failed to agree on and without which Yugoslavia is not ready to establish diplomatic relations, Prlic said.

The only certain thing at this point is that the foreign ministers will meet again tomorrow to sign the minutes which state that citizens of each country have the right to enter freely and reside in the respective countries without visas or other special border regimes. Moreover, it is expected that an agreement will be signed this evening on the reestablishment of air, road, and telecommunications traffic. [Words indistinct] aimed at achieving certain results.

FRY: Lilic on FRY's Reintegration Into International Bodies

LD2307163896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1623 GMT 23 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 23 (TANJUG)—President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) Zoran Lilic pointed out on Tuesday that the F.R.Y. believed in the success of elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) after which, he expected, the international community would completely fulfil its obligations and enable the F.R.Y. to be reintegrated into international political and financial institutions.

Lilic stated this in a talk with a Russian government delegation headed by Minister for Emergency Situations Sergey Shoygu, the presidential office said in an announcement.

Lilic emphasized that the basic objectives of the F.R.Y. were peace and economic recovery, the full normalization of relations with the former Yugoslav republics and the inclusion into groupings in the Balkans and Europe.

He added that the F.R.Y. was rightly expecting the correct international valuation of its political consistency.

In this, the F.R.Y. was expecting Russia's support, said Lilic in thanking the Russian people and leaders, especially President Boris Yeltsin, for their assistance to the F.R.Y. at the time of the biggest difficulties, as well as for their readiness to have comprehensive economic cooperation now established.

Lilic fully agreed with Shoygu's remark that the condition for lasting peace in the territory of former Yugoslavia was the international community's equal relationship towards both entities in the BiH—the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska—regarding not only the extension of humanitarian aid and resources for economic recovery but also the support to electing legal and legitimate organs of authority.

Lilic said that the international community's equal treatment is the condition for the maintenance of peace today, just as the condition yesterday was the achievement of peace accords.

Shoygu told Lilic that it was Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin who had proposed the visit to the F.R.Y. of this many-membered and competent delegation of ministers and senior officials in a number of ministries, and high representatives of foreign-trade and manufacturing enterprises.

Russia and the F.R.Y. signed here Tuesday an agreement on cooperation in the field of averting industrial accidents and natural disasters and alleviating the aftermath.

The two sides stressed at the talk they regarded this agreement very important, especially because it would provide for the customs-free extension of assistance.

Shoygu stressed that the delegation had arrived to carry out also a number of concrete arrangements of extending assistance and signing economic, trade and financial contracts with partners from the F.R.Y. and from the Republika Srpska, the Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

FRY: Belgrade, Moscow To Cooperate in Emergency Situations

*LD2307163696 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1441 GMT 23 Jul 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 23 (TANJUG)—The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) and Russia signed here Tuesday an agreement on cooperation in all possible emergency situations.

The agreement on the control of industrial accidents and the alleviation of aftermath of natural disasters was signed by Yugoslav Labour Minister Miroslav Ivanisevic and Russian Emergency Situations Minister and Russian Security Councillor Sergey Shoygu.

Before signing the agreement, the two ministers pointed out that the F.R.Y. was counting on cooperation in the field of monitoring dangerous technological and ecological process and natural phenomena, averting industrial accidents, forecasting elementary disasters, exchanging experts and scientists, conducting joint research projects, personnel training, and holding joint technical meetings.

After the signing, Ivanisevic said the F.R.Y., like Russia, was brought under obligation to regulate this matter in more details. He added that Russian experts' experience would be greatly useful for the competent bodies here.

Shoygu said that 'all means would be used to help each other in the possible emergency situations.' He hoped that the agreement would never have to be applied.

Shoygu underlined the humanitarian and political aspects of the agreement and added that Russia had already been maintaining this sort of cooperation with Italy, France, the United States, China and Japan.

FRY: Government Calls Talks With London Club 'Successful'

*LD1907165096 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1605 GMT 19 Jul 96*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 19 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government said Friday that the renewal of relations with the London Club was vital for the normalisation of Yugoslavia's ties with world financial institutions.

The government adopted a report on talks between a Yugoslav delegation and officials of the International Coordinating Committee of Commercial Banks (London Club) held in late June, describing the talks as successful and useful.

The Yugoslav delegation raised all key issues concerning the regulation of commercial debts, the Yugoslav information secretariat said.

The leading commercial banks, in their capacity as creditors, have expressed readiness to normalise relations with Yugoslavia and have stressed the importance of the country's return to the world capital market.

The commercial banks that are members of the London Club are willing to reorganise Yugoslavia's debt and approve new financial arrangements that would be in the both sides' interest.

The fact that talks with the London Club are to resume soon confirms the readiness on the part of about 400 leading commercial banks in the world to normalise relations with Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav Government has determined a platform for talks that will resume in London on 24-26 July together with the National Bank of Yugoslavia and a number of Yugoslav commercial banks.

FRY: Left-Wing Parties Conclude Seminar in Belgrade

*LD2307220196 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2151 GMT 23 Jul 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 23 (TANJUG)—Peace, development, equality, social equality and humanism remain the goals of left-wing parties, regardless of differences among them, it was concluded Tuesday in Belgrade at the end of the two-day international seminar 'The Left—Why and How.'

Speaking on behalf of the Yugoslav Left (JUL) which organized the meeting, member of JUL leadership Prof. Vladimir Stambuk said that the left must overcome not only its own crisis but also the crisis of the society.

Urging for the creation of a Balkan alliance of the left following the model of JUL, the president of Albanian Ecologic Party Namik Hoti condemned the terror practiced by Albanian authorities which even resort to assaulting those who do not share their opinions.

Athanassios Pappas of Greek Communist Party said that his party rejected the idea that the left should no longer exist after the downfall of Soviet communism.

Italian M.P. and member of the renewed Italian Communist Party Tuglio Grimaldi noted that great communist parties such as Soviet, Italian and some others were no more, and urged for a united action of the left in confronting capitalism.

British Communist Party representative Kenny Coyle said that for a large part of the world progress was nearly non-existent, and added that at the approach of the new millennium the world was increasingly being characterized by conflicts.

Member of the Romanian Socialist Labor Party leadership Gheorghe Pele cited the international anti-Yugoslav sanctions in urging the left to fight the policy of embargo

used by powerful states to subject some countries and regions to their own interests.

Member of Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) leadership Goran Percevic recalled that in the past six years, during the anti-left storm in Europe and the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia, SPS as the ruling party was fighting to defend the ideas of the left.

Referring to the international aspect of SPS policy, he said the party advocated participation in European and world integration processes and the policy of good neighborliness, cooperation and strengthening of ties among Balkan states.

FRY: Commission Approves Task Force Report on Succession

*LD1807200796 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1925 GMT 18 Jul 96*

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, July 18 (TANJUG)—The relevant governmental commission approved in Belgrade on Thursday the report by the Yugoslav task force on talks held in Brussels on July 8, a government statement said.

The Commission for Relations with the Peace Implementation Council and World Financial and Trade Bodies approved also the report by the Yugoslav delegation to London talks with the International Coordinating Committee of Commercial Banks held on June 27-18.

The body decided that the Yugoslav delegation to upcoming talks with the London Club of creditors offer as a model for reorganising the country's foreign debt the conversion of this debt into foreign investment.

The commission, whose session was chaired by Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, took the view that, after the lifting of years-long sanctions, this would facilitate the Yugoslav economy's resumption of normal production and servicing of its foreign debt.

The body reviewed also the method of work and conceptual approach of the task force on succession.

The intention is to bring the positions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav republics on the division of assets and liabilities of the former federation closer together in the fourth round of talks, scheduled for September.

The commission adopted a platform for the resumption of talks with the International Coordinating Committee of Commercial Banks, to be held in London on July 24-26.

FRY: Official Urges Bosnian Refugees To Register for Elections

AU2307171596 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 23 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Federal Government's Commission for Help and Organization of Refugee Vote in the upcoming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina has the task of making it possible for refugees in the FRY to realize their electoral rights. Aleksandar Radovanovic, member of and spokesman for the Commission of the Refugee Commissariat of the Republic of Serbia, noted the following on what the Federal Commission had undertaken so far:

[Radovanovic] What is significant for us in the FRY is that, according to the regulations of the OSCE, refugees who do not want to vote in the places from where they fled but have the possibility to vote in places where they want to live in the future, must do so in person. According to the data collected in the field available to us, almost two-thirds of the overall number of refugees will have to go to vote in towns in the Serb Republic. This is an extremely large burden and demands a mass departure for elections.

However, as that is only the second stage, we now appeal to refugees to register by end of this week because if they fail to do so, they will not be able to realize their electoral rights. This means that they must fill out registration forms in one of 4,500 local communities, municipalities, and regions on the territory of Serbia and the FRY on the basis of which we shall create [word indistinct] lists. I would also like to say that refugees have the right to vote in these elections but that this has no connection with their status in the FRY. In other words, when going to vote they do not lose their refugee status and are not obligated to immediately return to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Serbia

Serbia: SDU Calls Ganic Visit 'Step Forward'

AU2307203096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1255 GMT 23 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 23 Jul (BETA)—Zarko Korac, president of the Social Democratic Union [SDU] today hailed the visit of Ejup Ganic, Bosnia-

Herzegovina Presidency member and Federation vice president, to Belgrade because it represents "a step forward" in the normalization of relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Korac said at the press conference that he could not understand why the talks had to take place at someone else's initiative instead of "our arranging it ourselves."

The SDU president said that pressure applied on Radovan Karadzic by Richard Holbrooke had evidently "yielded results." Karadzic was forced to step down from all functions, which has created the minimum of conditions for holding September elections in Bosnia, Korac added.

He assessed reactions in Serbia according to which Karadzic had stepped down for "patriotic reasons" as "cynical" since "Karadzic has shown that he does not have the faintest idea of what is in the best interests of either FRY or Serb Republic [RS] citizens."

According to Korac, "many problems remain" in the RS because of Karadzic's "successors, primarily Biljana Plavsic, who are just as extreme as he is."

Serbia: Democratic Party Assails Invitation to Bosnia's Ganic

LD2307224296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1708 GMT 23 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 23 Jul (SRNA)—The Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS] today assessed the invitation to Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Muslim-Croat Federation, to visit Belgrade as an expression of the "humiliation and complete capitulation of Slobodan Milosevic."

The party says in a statement that Ganic is most responsible for the massacre of recruits of the former Yugoslav People's Army in Dobrovoljacka Ulica in Sarajevo "and his place is therefore at The Hague, not Belgrade."

"The establishment of political and economic ties between Serbia and the Muslim-Croat Federation before such relations are fully resolved with the [Bosnian] Serb Republic is totally unacceptable from the point of view of Serb national interests," the DSS statement says.

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